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PARALLEL ENFORCEMENT AND AGENCY 
INTERDEPENDENCE 
ANTHONY O’ROURKE* 
 Parallel civil and criminal enforcement dominates public en-
forcement of everything from securities regulation to immigration 
control.  The scholarship, however, lacks any structural analysis 
of how parallel enforcement differs from other types of inter-
agency coordination.  Drawing on original interviews with pros-
ecutors, regulators, and white-collar defense attorneys, this Arti-
cle is the first to provide a realistic presentation of how parallel 
enforcement works in practice.  It builds on this descriptive ac-
count to offer an explanatory theory of the pressures and incen-
tives that shape parallel enforcement.  The Article shows that, in 
parallel proceedings, criminal prosecutors lack the gatekeeping 
monopoly that traditionally defines their relationships with inves-
tigating agents.  This constitutive feature of parallel proceedings 
explains many of the institutional design choices that shape our 
regimes of overlapping civil and criminal enforcement. 
INTRODUCTION 
Prosecutors and civil regulators routinely combine their resources to 
pursue concurrent actions against the same defendant in a variety of do-
mains: financial regulation,1 immigration control,2 environmental law,3 tax 
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 1.  See Speech, Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, All-Encompassing Enforcement: The Robust 
Use of Civil and Criminal Actions to Police the Markets (Mar. 31, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541342996#_ftnref4 (“In the vast majority 
of criminal securities fraud prosecutions, the SEC’s Enforcement staff works closely with the 
criminal authorities, whether it be DOJ, the FBI, or state and local law enforcement.”). 
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enforcement,4 and others.  To agency outsiders, the mechanics of this prac-
tice—known as parallel enforcement—are dimly understood.  Indeed, the 
term “parallel enforcement” itself is a misnomer that contributes to the pub-
lic’s misunderstanding of inter-agency practices.  Lawyers and litigators use 
the term to refer to cases that criminal and civil regulatory agencies pursue 
concurrently.5  Contrary to what the term “parallel” suggests, however, 
prosecutors and regulators do not bring these cases “side by side” without 
crossing investigative paths.6  Instead, to the fullest extent the law per-
mits—and the law permits a great deal7—these actors coordinate closely to 
maximize their strategic advantages over defendants. 
Consider, for example, the civil and criminal insider trading cases 
against SAC Capital’s Mathew Martoma.  The district court’s decision in 
                                                          
 2.  See, e.g., Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States § 11, Exec. Order 
No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/01/25/presidential-executive-order-enhancing-public-safety-interior-united (“The At-
torney General and the Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall work together to develop and im-
plement a program that ensures that adequate resources are devoted to the prosecution of criminal 
immigration offenses in the United States, and to develop cooperative strategies to reduce violent 
crime and the reach of transnational criminal organizations into the United States.”). 
 3.  See Timothy J. Chapman, Parallel Proceedings in Federal Environmental Crimes Cases, 
U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL., July 2012, at 31 (“Department of Justice . . . litigating components are obli-
gated to pursue parallel proceedings under appropriate circumstances.”). 
 4.  See, e.g., I.R.S. POLICY STATEMENT 4-26, IRM 1.2.13.1.11 (Oct. 5, 2005) (encouraging 
intra-agency coordination of civil and criminal proceedings). 
 5.  See, e.g., Eli Ewing, Comment, Too Close for Comfort: United States v. Stringer and 
United States v. Scrushy Impose a Stricter Standard on SEC/DOJ Parallel Proceedings, 25 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 217, 217 (2006) (defining parallel proceedings as “involv[ing] concurrent inves-
tigations of the same conduct by different government agencies, as an efficient means of law en-
forcement”); Charlotte Taylor, The Rise of Parallel Proceedings in Health Care Fraud Investiga-
tions: How to Tell When You’re a Target, JONES DAY (Apr. 2014), http://www.jonesday.com/the-
rise-of-parallel-proceedings-in-health-care-fraud-investigations-how-to-tell-when-youre-a-target/ 
(defining “parallel proceedings” as “a shorthand term for simultaneous criminal, civil and admin-
istrative investigations”).  As it is frequently used by litigators and regulators, the term is under-
inclusive in that it often does not refer to any private civil lawsuits that are filed concurrently with 
a criminal or regulatory action.  Cf. Jefferson M. Gray, Potential Ethical Issues in Parallel Pro-
ceedings, U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL., May 2007, at 42, 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2008/07/29/usab5503.pdf (defining “paral-
lel proceedings” as “matters opened as possible federal criminal cases” that are “under active in-
vestigation by federal or state regulatory agencies, or even by private civil counsel”).  The risk of 
such private lawsuits is one of the most pressing concerns of the white-collar defense attorneys 
with whom I spoke.  See also Christine P. Bartholomew, Redefining Prey and Predator in Class 
Actions, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 743, 796 (2015) (“Unlike government enforcement, which wavers by 
administrative interest, politics, and economic resources, private class actions have the potential 
for more constant regulatory oversight . . . .” (footnote omitted)).  A full examination of this issue, 
however, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 6.  Parallel, ENGLISH: OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/parallel (last visited Apr. 30, 2018) (defining “paral-
lel”). 
 7.  See infra Part I.A. 
 2018] PARALLEL ENFORCEMENT 987 
 
United States v. Martoma8 offers a rare, though incomplete glimpse at the 
degree of coordination involved in parallel proceedings.9  Martoma’s case is 
unusual in that he opted for a criminal trial, but the structure of the govern-
ment’s coordinated investigation was not exceptional.10  By describing the 
trajectory of this investigation, the court revealed some of the hallmarks of 
contemporary parallel proceedings: information-sharing, jointly conducted 
witness interviews, investigation through means other than confidential 
grand jury subpoenas, and other forms of close coordination.11 
The civil and criminal cases against Martoma were tightly coordinated 
and devastatingly effective.12  The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) traced suspicious trades to Martoma and collaborated with Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agents to build “parallel” civil and criminal 
cases against him.13  As the investigation proceeded, the SEC shared every 
document it obtained through civil discovery from SAC Capital with prose-
cutors in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York 
(“SDNY”).14  SEC attorneys and SDNY prosecutors also jointly conducted 
twenty interviews of a dozen witnesses.15  In advance of a crucial deposition 
in the civil case, SEC attorneys met with an SDNY prosecutor to discuss 
the evidence against the deponent.16  SEC attorneys called this prosecutor 
during a break in the deposition to discuss the testimony, and they updated 
the prosecutor after the deposition concluded.17  The U.S. Attorney’s Office 
                                                          
 8.  990 F. Supp. 2d 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  The case concerned Martoma’s use of nonpublic 
information about a clinical drug trial and appears to have been part of the government’s unsuc-
cessful quest to bring criminal charges against billionaire SAC Capital manager, Steven A. Cohen.  
See Patrick Radden Keefe, The Empire of Edge, NEW YORKER (Oct. 13, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/13/empire-edge. 
 9.  See Martoma, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 460–62. 
 10.  See infra Part I.A. 
 11.  See infra Part II.B–C. 
 12.  The parallel proceedings resulted in Martoma’s conviction and sentence of nine years 
imprisonment and a $600 million SEC settlement with a wholly owned subsidiary of SAC Capital.  
Press Release, SEC, CR Intrinsic Agrees to Pay More than $600 Million in Largest-Ever Settle-
ment for Insider Trading Case (Mar. 15, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171513308; Matthew Gold-
stein, Martoma, SAC Capital Ex-Trader, Gets 9 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/08/hours-before-sentencing-u-s-judge-says-cohen-trades-
should-count-against-martoma/. 
 13.  See Keefe, supra note 8. 
 14.  See Martoma, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 461.  
 15.  See id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
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then used this information to prepare for one of its witness interviews the 
following day.18 
While Martoma partially demystifies the mechanics of parallel en-
forcement,19 larger questions remain unanswered.  What are the pressures 
and incentives that motivate prosecutors and civil enforcers to coordinate, 
or that deter them from doing so?  How do coordination choices influence 
the organizational design of civil and criminal enforcement agencies?  And 
what practical constraints, if any, does the doctrine governing parallel pro-
ceedings impose on the government? 
Strangely, scholars have failed to appreciate the need to answer these 
questions.  To say that we need a new way of thinking about parallel en-
forcement is an understatement.  We need a way of thinking about it.20  
This Article is the first to offer one.  It uses original interviews, as well as 
publicly available sources, to describe everyday enforcement practices and 
large-scale institutional structures that scholars have left unexamined.  
Building upon this descriptive account, the Article presents a theoretical 
framework for explaining how prosecutors and regulators decide whether to 
coordinate, and how these choices influence larger agency decisions con-
cerning hiring, training, operational hierarchy, and more. 
This framework reveals that, contrary to received assumptions, the en-
forcement choices of prosecutors and civil regulators are deeply interde-
pendent.  The traditional story about parallel enforcement is one of static 
institutional competences.  Prosecutors have investigative expertise and trial 
experience that civil enforcers lack.21  Civil regulators, meanwhile, possess 
granular knowledge of complex regulatory regimes that generalist prosecu-
tors cannot hope to (and do not care to) match.22  This dynamic makes pros-
ecutors and regulators susceptible to different sorts of enforcement patholo-
gies.  Prosecutors will zealously prosecute (and grandstand about) 
regulatory cases that experts regard as trivial or unjust.23  Regulators, by 
                                                          
 18.  Id.  This investigation led the district court to conclude that the coordination between the 
SEC and federal prosecutors was sufficient to require the U.S. Attorney’s Office to disclose any 
exculpatory documents in the SEC’s possession.  See id. at 462. 
 19.  See also United States v. Gupta, 848 F. Supp. 2d 491, 492–94, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (de-
scribing parallel investigation practices and holding that the SEC was part of a joint investigation 
for Brady purposes). 
 20.  Cf. Brandon L. Garrett, Collaborative Organizational Prosecution, in PROSECUTORS IN 
THE BOARDROOM 159 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) (explaining “we 
know few details about the precise nature” of collaboration between prosecutors and regulators in 
the area of financial regulation and stating, “[r]elationships between prosecutors and regulators 
should be studied further”). 
 21.  See infra notes 387–388 and accompanying text. 
 22.  See infra notes 414–415 and accompanying text. 
 23.  Cf. Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 33 (1997).  Lynch queries, 
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contrast, will prioritize easily settled cases while failing to adequately sanc-
tion misconduct that outsiders justifiably deem outrageous.24 
This story contains much truth, but it is woefully incomplete.  In de-
termining whether to coordinate on parallel proceedings, the relevant in-
quiry is not simply whether agency X possesses more expertise than agen-
cy Y.  One must also consider whether agency X possesses a sufficient level 
of expertise to pursue its enforcement goals unilaterally.  A prosecutor’s of-
fice can develop the substantive expertise necessary to unilaterally prose-
cute regulatory crimes, and a civil enforcement agency can build litigation 
and investigation expertise sufficient to pursue important cases on its own.  
Comparative transaction costs influence the decision whether to invest in 
such expertise.  A prosecutor may, for example, be influenced by the risk 
that a civil enforcement agency will inadvertently create documents that are 
potentially exculpatory and thus discoverable.25  This risk—which this Arti-
cle is the first to identify and describe—can generate tension between pros-
ecutors and civil regulators and may even tempt prosecutors to decline cas-
es referred from offices they deem problematic.26 
Borrowing a concept from institutional economics, this Article con-
tends that the choices of prosecutors and regulators about whether to engage 
in parallel enforcement are analogous to the “make-or-buy” decisions that 
shape the contractual relationships between private firms.27  In traditional, 
standalone criminal cases, prosecutors and investigators are bilaterally de-
                                                          
Why leave significant aspects of securities, environmental or tax enforcement, for ex-
ample, to generalist criminal prosecutors, who usually know little about the technicali-
ties of the regulatory regime, and who may for that reason underenforce significant 
norms whose importance is not apparent to non-experts, or over-enthusiastically pursue 
claims that appear quixotic, excessive, or even perverse to specialized agencies? 
Id. 
 24.  See, e.g., Matt Taibbi, The Great American Bubble Machine, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 5, 
2010), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-great-american-bubble-machine-20100405.  
Taibbi argues, 
If you laddered and spun 50 Internet IPOs that went bust within a year, so what?  By 
the time the Securities and Exchange Commission got around to fining your firm $110 
million, the yacht you bought with your IPO bonuses was already six years old.  Be-
sides, you were probably out of Goldman by then, running the U.S. Treasury or maybe 
the state of New Jersey. 
Id.  For a similar (if less vituperative) critique from a relative insider, see Jed S. Rakoff, The Fi-
nancial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 
2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-
prosecutions/ (observing that budget cuts have recently “led the SEC enforcement staff to focus on 
the smaller, easily resolved cases that will beef up their statistics when they go to Congress beg-
ging for money”).   
 25.  Several interviewees described this as “creating Brady material.”  See infra notes 355–
371 and accompanying text.  
 26.  See infra notes 372–384 and accompanying text. 
 27.  See infra notes 209–213 and accompanying text. 
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pendent: prosecutors must rely on investigators to build a case, and investi-
gators must rely on prosecutors to litigate those cases.28  In parallel proceed-
ings, by contrast, prosecutors and regulators may choose whether to work 
together.  If the transaction costs of coordinating are too steep, an enforce-
ment agency can redeploy its resources toward collaborating with a differ-
ent agency—what I call “buying” that agency’s expertise.  Alternatively, 
the agency can invest those resources in developing the capacities necessary 
to “make” its own cases.  Over time, an agency will reallocate its resources 
and terminate an enforcement relationship that generates unacceptable 
transaction costs.29  Thus, the iterated decisions of individual prosecutors 
and regulators, in specific cases, serve over time to motivate agency in-
vestment choices and, ultimately, shape the architecture of parallel en-
forcement. 
This framework offers new insights into the coordination strategies of 
prosecutors and regulators.  It reveals, for example, that agencies will often 
face a counterintuitive choice between investing in its own capacities and 
helping to strengthen the capacities of another agency.  To illustrate: in the 
wake of the Bernie Madoff scandal, the SEC made significant reforms to its 
Enforcement Division.30  As an outgrowth of these reforms, the SEC in-
vested in building the capacity of various U.S. Attorney’s Offices in order 
to expand the collaborative options available to the agency on parallel en-
forcement matters.31  That is, the SEC chose to invest its resources into 
building the capabilities of another agency.  This strategic possibility stands 
in tension with the requirement that agencies measure their success, and 
make funding requests to Congress, on the basis of “objective, quantifiable” 
performance metrics.32  As the SEC’s post-Madoff reforms demonstrate, an 
agency’s improved performance can sometimes be traced to the decisions of 
another agency.  Measuring an agency’s performance in isolation obscures 
this reality.  It may also create perverse incentives for one agency to avoid 
investing in another’s success although doing so would redound to the ben-
efit of both agencies in the long run.33 
To develop the Article, I conducted more than twenty interviews with 
current and former prosecutors (both local and federal), white-collar de-
fense attorneys, and enforcement attorneys at the SEC and Commodity Fu-
                                                          
 28.  See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 749, 758–78 (2003). 
 29.  See infra notes 218–220 and accompanying text. 
 30.  See infra Part III.A. 
 31.  See infra Part III.B. 
 32.  31 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(2) (2012). 
 33.  Cf. Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 
1677 (2011) (discussing the potential of poorly designed performance metrics to create perverse 
agency incentives). 
 2018] PARALLEL ENFORCEMENT 991 
 
tures Trading Commission (“CFTC”).34  Many of these interviewees have 
occupied high-level positions in their respective agencies.  Others gained 
salient experience in mid-level enforcement positions before building suc-
cessful careers in the private sector.  Most of the interviewees requested an-
onymity as a condition of having their views discussed in this Article.35  
Sensitive to the concerns this might raise, I use publicly available sources 
(including congressional testimony and other agency statements) to support 
claims about institutional reforms that have previously gone unexamined in 
legal scholarship.  I also have refrained from repeating any sensitive or sur-
prising information about prosecutorial or regulatory behavior that I was 
not able to corroborate with at least two sources.  These interviews provide 
texture and support for my core theoretical claims, but I also support these 
claims using more conventional sources and evidence.36 
This Article has five Parts.  Part I describes the formal and informal 
policies that structure contemporary parallel proceedings and assesses the 
doctrine that governs—or fails to govern—those policies.  Part II illustrates 
the need for an accurate descriptive theory of parallel enforcement by iden-
tifying two systemic normative problems that the practice poses.  From a 
regulatory perspective, parallel enforcement may distort the goals of civil 
enforcers by incentivizing them to prioritize cases that are not consistent 
with the distinct goals of civil regulatory enforcement.  From a due process 
standpoint, parallel enforcement deepens information asymmetries between 
defendants and prosecutors, and can generate new asymmetries between de-
fendants and civil enforcers. 
Because courts are reluctant to use doctrine to regulate coordination 
between prosecutors and civil regulators, any effective institutional-level 
reforms of parallel enforcement will require a sound descriptive theory of 
the type this Article offers.  The theoretical core of this Article is therefore 
Part III, which presents the make-or-buy framework and fully describes the 
considerations that shape prosecutors and civil regulators’ coordination de-
cisions.  Part IV uses the make-or-buy framework to analyze specific insti-
tutional reforms at the SEC and the CFTC, and in doing so highlights the 
interdependence of agencies’ structural enforcement choices. 
Part V applies the make-or-buy framework to analyze a new—and 
heretofore unexamined—form of inter-agency coordination.  Specifically, it 
                                                          
 34.  I interviewed ten individuals, most of whom generously granted me multiple interviews. 
 35.  To more fully protect the anonymity of those who made this request, I have chosen to 
maintain the anonymity of every interviewee.  After each interview, I received confirmation from 
the interviewees that my characterization of their views—relayed using language largely identical 
to that used in this Article—was accurate. 
 36.  For a model of and precedent for this methodological approach in legal scholarship, see 
David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful 
Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 519–20 (2013). 
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examines agreements that the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has reached 
with the SEC and CFTC to embed FBI agents and analysts within those 
regulatory agencies.  These “embed programs” greatly expand the data and 
information that the participating agencies are legally able to share with one 
another.  By doing so, the programs raise due process questions that have 
not yet been addressed—and perhaps cannot be addressed—by case law.  
Any serious normative analysis of these programs requires a careful analy-
sis of the incentives and pressures that have shaped them.  The make-or-buy 
framework facilitates such analysis. 
I.  CONSTITUTIVE FEATURES OF PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS 
The official policy statements of the DOJ and several civil regulatory 
agencies suggest that the criminal and civil enforcement coordination pro-
cess is formalized and tightly monitored.37  In reality, parallel enforcement 
involves close and informal collaboration at every stage of the criminal and 
civil proceedings.  This Part describes these methods of formal and infor-
mal coordination and examines the doctrinal framework that permits them.  
Any efforts to reform this doctrine, it argues, are likely to be futile and per-
haps undesirable. 
A.  Formal and Informal Coordination Mechanisms 
It is difficult to overstate the zeal with which the DOJ and regulatory 
agencies have embraced parallel enforcement as a way of facilitating their 
enforcement objectives.38  The DOJ and many other regulatory agencies ex-
                                                          
 37.  See, e.g., infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text. 
 38.  See Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 253–54 (2015).  This 
claim begs the question, what are those enforcement objectives?  In other words, what are this Ar-
ticle’s assumptions concerning what civil and criminal enforcement organizations seek to “max-
imize”?  See also Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 n.80 (2015) (noting 
the scholarly debate on “what prosecutors ‘maximize’” and citing sources contributing to it).  
With respect to this question, I will adopt the pragmatic assumption that both civil and criminal 
enforcement agencies seek to maximize some combination of the number and importance of the 
convictions and favorable judgments they obtain.  Whether agencies are motivated by public poli-
cy goals (for example, retribution and deterrence), prestige, or budget maximization, their incen-
tives will steer them toward this particular set of enforcement outcomes.  I further assume a rough 
alignment between these organizational goals and the incentives of individual enforcers.  For liter-
ature supporting defending these assumptions concerning prosecutors and their institutions, see, 
for example, id. at 32 (“To the extent [the prosecutor] wishes to improve her reputation and 
chances at promotion, she must maximize her overall conviction rate and her average length of 
criminal sentence.”); Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Pun-
ishment, 112 MICH. L. REV. 397, 403 (2013) (“[P]rosecutors have their own incentives and ambi-
tions.  They tend to use their leverage to move cases through the system quickly and to maximize 
convictions, thus promoting deterrence and incapacitation.”); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. 
United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 967 (1997) 
(“Whatever prosecutors’ private motivations are, however, the need to maximize convictions will 
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plicitly prioritized the use of parallel proceedings and adopted policy state-
ments to formalize the coordination of criminal and civil regulators.  If one 
were to describe the structure of parallel proceedings using only agency 
policy statements, however, the picture would be a distorted one.39  Accord-
ingly, an accurate account of parallel proceedings requires an examination 
of both the formal and informal policies that facilitate both intra- and inter-
agency coordination between prosecutors and civil regulators. 
First, it is clear from formal agency policies that parallel proceedings 
are central to the enforcement aims of the civil and criminal regulators.  The 
SEC, for example, includes a performance metric in its annual report to 
Congress on the criminal activities related to conduct under investigation by 
the agency.40  The CFTC likewise advertises the extent to which it cooper-
ates with criminal authorities on its enforcement matters.41  Perhaps the 
most revealing institutional commitment to parallel enforcement, however, 
is the DOJ’s 2012 policy statement—which took the form of a memo from 
Attorney General Eric Holder (the “Holder Memo”)—governing parallel 
proceedings.42  The goal of this policy statement was to “update and further 
                                                          
be an inescapable environmental constraint.”).  For literature supporting the assumptions as they 
apply to regulatory agencies and their staff, see also Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-
Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 875–86 (2014) (describing civil enforcers’ 
reputational incentives to seek out and publicize large monetary judgments); David Zaring, 
Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 507, 549 (2013) (suggesting “the 
incentives of reputation, effectiveness, and mission fulfillment” may explain his findings that, for 
152 former Southern District of New York prosecutors, there is no evidence that those who en-
tered the private sector had less lucrative employment opportunities if they aggressively pursued 
convictions than if they did not do so). 
 39.  For other examples of formalized criminal referral policies, see U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL § 6-5-2, 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/ucm176738.htm#S
UB6-5-2 (providing that the FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations “is responsible for review-
ing all matters in FDA for which a criminal investigation is recommended,” and “FDA personnel 
must refer all criminal matters, regardless of their complexity or breadth, to OCI,” and “[d]istrict 
management must communicate with the local OCI office before pursuing any criminal matter”); 
Memorandum from Granta Y. Nakayama, Assistant Adm’r, EPA Office of Env’t & Compliance 
Assurance, to EPA Regional Admins. et al. 7 (Sept. 24, 2007), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/parallel-proceedings-policy-09-24-07.pdf 
[hereinafter EPA Parallel Proceedings Memo]; see also Garrett, supra note 20, at 161–63 (discuss-
ing the policies of the EPA and the IRS). 
 40.  See SEC, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, FISCAL YEAR 2017 ANNUAL 
PERFORMANCE PLAN & FISCAL YEAR 2015 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 41 (2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy17congbudgjust.pdf. 
 41.  See, e.g., Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Releases Annual Enforcement Results for Fiscal 
Year 2016 (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7488-16 (“[T]he 
[Enforcement] Division continued and intensified its already close cooperation with the criminal 
authorities in pursuing criminal sanctions, including prison time for culpable individuals, for will-
ful violations of the Commodity Exchange Act.”). 
 42.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, TAX 
RESOURCE MANUAL § 22, https://www.justice.gov/usam/tax-resource-manual-22-parallel-
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strengthen” the degree to which the “Department[’s] prosecutors and civil 
attorneys coordinate together and with agency attorneys.”43  Accordingly, 
the Holder Memo encourages aggressive collaboration between prosecutors 
and civil regulators both within and outside the DOJ.44 
The Holder Memo encourages DOJ attorneys to coordinate at every 
stage of a matter that has the potential to generate both civil and criminal 
liability.45  To this end the Holder Memo directs every U.S. Attorney’s Of-
fice and litigating component of Main Justice to “have policies and proce-
dures for early and appropriate coordination of the government’s criminal, 
civil, regulatory and administrative remedies.”46  This imperative has opera-
tional implications for both criminal and civil DOJ lawyers.47  Specifically, 
the Holder Memo instructs the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the litigating unit 
within Main Justice to adopt policies concerning how parallel enforcement 
goals shape the selection (“intake”), investigation, and resolution of cases.48  
With respect to case selection, civil and criminal authorities within the DOJ 
must coordinate at early stages to determine whether both civil and criminal 
                                                          
proceedings; Memorandum from the Attorney General Eric M. Holder on Coordination of Parallel 
Criminal, Civil, Regulatory, and Administrative Proceedings to all U.S. Attorneys et al., in U.S. 
Attorneys’ Organization & Functions Manual § 27 (Jan. 30, 2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/organization-and-functions-manual-27-parallel-proceedings/ [here-
inafter Holder Memo].  The Holder Memo is the sole policy statement governing the DOJ’s paral-
lel enforcement practices except with respect to tax matters.  The United States Attorney Manual 
includes relatively detailed guidance for parallel proceedings involving the IRS, which is con-
strained by rules governing the confidentiality of tax information.  Cf. Garrett, supra note 20, at 
163 (discussing IRS parallel proceedings rules that exist “in part because it must follow certain 
rules regarding confidentiality of tax return information”). 
 43.  Holder Memo, supra note 42. 
 44.  With respect to coordination between civil and criminal DOJ attorneys, the Holder Memo 
formalizes protocols for a type of intra-agency coordination of the sort that Professor Jennifer Nou 
has recently analyzed.  See generally Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 421 (2015). 
 45.  See Holder Memo, supra note 42 (instructing DOJ attorneys, both criminal and civil, to 
“timely communicate, coordinate, and cooperate with one another and agency attorneys to the 
fullest extent appropriate to the case and by permissible law, whenever an alleged offense or vio-
lation of federal law gives rise to the potential for criminal, civil, regulatory, and/or agency admin-
istrative parallel (simultaneous or successive) proceedings”). 
 46.  Id.  The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual offers little guidance about the criminal referral process 
other than requiring that “[w]henever an attorney for the government declines to commence or 
recommend federal prosecution, he/she should ensure that his/her decision and the reasons there-
fore are communicated to the investigating agency involved and to any other interested agency, 
and are also reflected in the office files.”  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ 
MANUAL § 9-27.270(A), https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-
prosecution#9-27.270. 
 47.  The U.S. Attorney’s Office policies are not publicly available.  To the extent these poli-
cies include rigid guidance about initiating parallel proceedings, however, they would contrast 
sharply with the informal process that was described by some of the former federal prosecutors 
whom I interviewed.  Interview with anonymous source 1, DOJ [hereinafter I-1]; Interview with 
anonymous source 4, DOJ [hereinafter I-4]. 
 48.  Holder Memo, supra note 42. 
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prosecution is appropriate.49  As to investigation, the memo urges prosecu-
tors to “us[e] investigative means other than grand jury subpoenas for doc-
uments or witness testimony.”50  This type of criminal investigation “out-
side the grand jury”—as practitioners call it—enables prosecutors to share 
information with regulators that they would otherwise be unable to disclose 
without judicial oversight.51  Civil attorneys, for their part, are instructed to 
“apprise prosecutors of discovery obtained in civil, regulatory, and adminis-
trative actions that could be material to criminal investigations.”52  Finally, 
the Holder Memo advises DOJ attorneys to “assess the potential impact” of 
any case resolution (including declination, indictment, guilty plea, sentenc-
ing, and civil settlement) “on criminal, civil, regulatory, and administrative 
proceedings to the extent appropriate.”53 
The DOJ’s policy statement might lead one to conclude that prosecu-
tors and regulators communicate through formal channels and at arm’s 
length.  In reality, however, there is a large set of informal norms that gov-
ern the relationships between prosecutors and civil regulators.  To be clear, 
the relationships between regulators and prosecutors vary even among 
agencies that prioritize parallel enforcement.54  The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (“IRS”), for example, has formal procedures for referring matters to 
criminal authorities outside the agency.55  Within these parameters, howev-
er, the agency has a policy designed to encourage parallel civil and criminal 
investigations within the agency.56  This policy requires the “civil and crim-
inal functions of the IRS” to coordinate at early stages of a case to deter-
mine whether parallel proceedings are appropriate.57  Although an Inspector 
General Report found institutional deficiencies with respect to how this 
                                                          
 49.  Id. (providing “[a] case referral from any source . . . is a referral for all purposes”). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See infra notes 286–288 and accompanying text. 
 52.  Holder Memo, supra note 42. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  See Garrett, supra note 20, at 162 (observing “the degree of collaboration [between agen-
cies and prosecutors] does not lend itself to generalization but depends very much on which feder-
al agency is involved, in which type of matter, and with which prosecutors”). 
 55.  Id. at 163 (“[T]he IRS has the most formalized procedures for investigation and referral 
of criminal matters, in part because it must follow certain rules regarding confidentiality of tax 
return information.”).  For example, the IRS lacks the statutory authority to settle a civil case after 
it has referred the matter to the Department of Justice.  See 26 U.S.C. § 7122(a) (2012); see also 
United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 312 (1978).  
 56.  I.R.S., IRM § 1.2.13.1.11, POLICY STATEMENT 4-26 (Oct. 5, 2005); see INSPECTOR GEN. 
FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE PARALLEL INVESTIGATIONS PROCESS NEEDS 
IMPROVEMENT (2013), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201330114fr.html 
(reporting that I.R.S. Policy Statement 4-26 “encourages civil enforcement actions in collabora-
tion with criminal investigations when abusive tax promotions are ongoing and harm to the Gov-
ernment is significant”). 
 57.  See I.R.S., supra note 56, at § 1.2.13.1.11(11). 
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parallel investigation policy was implemented, it nonetheless reported that 
there was “[f]requent informal communication between civil examiners and 
special agents” during the course of their investigations.58 
There is also some variation in the formality of institutional arrange-
ments between agencies with respect to parallel proceedings.  Some agen-
cies have entered into memoranda of understanding (“MoUs”) agreeing to 
coordinate enforcement efforts,59 but many have not.  Other agencies have 
policy guidelines that encourage the use of parallel proceedings and rec-
ommend certain discovery practices in connection with them.60  But such 
policies are non-binding and sometimes blithely disregarded.61  As a practi-
cal matter, much of the coordination between individual civil and criminal 
enforcers is largely informal.62 
In these agencies, the formal policies governing parallel proceedings 
sometimes obscure the actual breadth and depth of day-to-day collaboration 
between prosecutors and regulators.  In the SEC’s case, for example, there 
is a particularly pronounced gap between the formality of its regulations 
and the informality of its practices.  The agency makes use of an “informal 
referral process” that is—notwithstanding what its name might suggest—
highly rule-governed.63  Under the informal process, senior officers at the 
SEC may authorize staff to discuss nonpublic investigations with prosecu-
tors, staff of self-regulatory organizations, and state and local officials.64  
The SEC Enforcement Manual enumerates some considerations that should 
                                                          
 58.  See INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 56, at 8. 
 59.  For example, the IRS and the Departments of Labor and Treasury have “entered into a 
memorandum of understanding that that, among other things, established a mechanism for coordi-
nating enforcement and avoiding duplication of effort for shared jurisdiction.”  2011-42 I.R.B. 
548.   
 60.  See, e.g., Holder Memo, supra note 42; SEC, Enforcement Manual § 5.2.1 (Nov. 28, 
2017), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf.  
 61.  See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
469, 486–87 (1996) (“Although nominally subordinate to the Attorney General, U.S. Attorneys 
enjoy a strong history and culture of independence; for many, disregard of the United States At-
torneys’ Manual . . . is a source of pride.”).  But see Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, 
Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1440–43 (2008) (describing 
Main Justice’s efforts to control the independence of U. S. Attorneys’ Offices). 
 62.  Interview with anonymous source 2 [hereinafter I-2]. 
 63.  The term “informal” is used to distinguish the process from a formal referral, where staff 
prepares a report to the Commission, which then decides whether to refer the matter to the De-
partment of Justice for prosecution.  See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (2017); see THE SECURITIES 
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL: TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 394 (Michael J. Missal & Richard M. Phil-
lips eds., 2007).  However, this cumbersome process appears to have fallen into disuse.  See id.; 
Garrett, supra note 20, at 163; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-385, 
MUTUAL FUND TRADING ABUSES 1, 6 (2005) (reporting that the formal referral process had not 
been used for over twenty years). 
 64.  17 C.F.R. § 203.2 (2017) (permitting officers “at the level of Assistant Director or higher, 
and officials in Regional Offices at the level of Assistant Regional Director or higher” to make 
such authorizations).  
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inform a staff attorney’s decision whether to seek such authorization, in-
cluding “the egregiousness of the conduct, whether recidivism is a factor, 
and whether the involvement of criminal authorities will provide additional 
meaningful protection to investors.”65  Section 24(c) of the Exchange Act, 
however, permits the SEC to disclose information to prosecutors and others 
outside the agency only pursuant to a written “access request.”66  The SEC 
Enforcement Manual accordingly directs enforcement staff to “consult with 
their direct supervisors” and obtain approval from a senior officer if they 
are handling a matter “that appears to warrant an informal referral.”67  Once 
such approval is given, staff “may notify the appropriate criminal authori-
ties” and “invite [them] to make an access request.”68  The Manual further 
instructs that, once a referral has been made, “staff is encouraged and ex-
pected to maintain periodic communication with the criminal authorities 
concerning the status of any criminal investigation.”69 
To the uninitiated, these polices might suggest that SEC attorneys and 
prosecutors operate at arm’s length in the typical parallel enforcement case.  
In reality, one former senior officer at the SEC indicated that he was sur-
prised by the informality of the referral process when he joined the agen-
cy.70  This officer described two informal processes for transmitting infor-
mation to criminal authorities during his tenure.  First, in an effort to obtain 
high-value cases, some U.S. Attorneys would have regular meetings with 
senior officials in SEC Regional Offices and SEC Headquarters to learn 
about potentially interesting cases.  Based on these conversations, a U.S. 
Attorney might make a formal access request for information that they 
found promising.71  Second, the former senior official at the SEC described 
a relatively decentralized process by which SEC staff attorneys could solicit 
the interest of Assistant U.S. Attorneys in a particular case.72  If a SEC staff 
attorney decided that a target possessed the requisite level of criminal in-
tent, the staff attorney was effectively empowered to reach out to an Assis-
                                                          
 65.  SEC, Enforcement Manual § 5.6.1.  The Manual also instructs staff to “consider jurisdic-
tional factors, such as where the conduct occurred or the domicile of the possible violators or vic-
tims.”  Id. 
 66.  See SEC, supra note 60, § 5.1.2 (describing the access request program); 15 U.S.C. § 78x 
(2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.24c-1 (2017). 
 67.  SEC, Enforcement Manual, § 5.6.1. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  I-2; Interview with anonymous source 5 [hereinafter I-5]; Interview with anonymous 
source 9 [hereinafter I-9]. 
 71.  I-2. 
 72.  I-2. 
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tant U.S. Attorney and say, “I’ve got something interesting.”73  In either of 
these cases, a federal prosecutor’s access request was routinely granted.74 
Attorneys with experience at the CFTC describe a similar process by 
which the agency would transmit information to federal prosecutors.  
Moreover, CFTC attorneys coordinate closely with criminal authorities in 
advance of making a referral in order to gauge their potential interest in a 
case.  Like the SEC, the CFTC requires a written access request prior to 
sharing investigative files with prosecutors.75  Within the agency, an Office 
of Cooperative Enforcement housed within the Enforcement Division is 
tasked with “ensuring that enforcement of the commodity futures laws is 
addressed through civil, criminal, or administrative actions by state and 
Federal agencies or branches of government whenever possible.”76  The Di-
rector of Enforcement, however, holds final authority over the CFTC En-
forcement Division’s referral decisions.77  As an attorney familiar with the 
CFTC’s enforcement practices explained, however, there is often informal 
communication between the CFTC and a criminal authority in advance of 
deciding whether to refer a case.78  This suggests that, in both the CFTC and 
the SEC, prosecutors and regulators collaborate closely and informally at 
every stage of a parallel proceeding. 
B.  Doctrinal Non-Constraint 
The informality of parallel proceedings enables prosecutors to coordi-
nate in ways that enable them to circumvent the procedural regimes de-
signed to constrain them.79  Courts have been reluctant, however, to regu-
                                                          
 73.  I-2. 
 74.  I-2. 
 75.  17 C.F.R. § 140.73(a) (2017).  The CFTC’s implementing regulations, however, give the 
Commission broad authority to share investigative files and other information with prosecutors 
outside the agency.  See 17 C.F.R. § 11.3 (2017) (authorizing staff to share investigative material 
outside the agency if “the Commission directs or authorizes the public disclosure of the investiga-
tion”). 
 76.  Oversight of the Swaps and Futures Markets: Recent Events and Impending Regulatory 
Reforms: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 112th Cong. 111 (2012) (statement of 
Hon. Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n); see also Press Release, 
CFTC, CFTC’s Division of Enforcement Creates Office of Cooperative Enforcement (Oct. 23, 
2002), http://www.cftc.gov/opa/enf02/opa4715-02.htm (stating the Office of Cooperative En-
forcement is charged with the “task of reaching out to financial regulators on the federal and state 
level, to ensure that they are coordinating investigations and prosecutions of commodities viola-
tors, and to ensure that the government addresses misconduct whenever appropriate”). 
 77.  Interview with anonymous source 8 [hereinafter I-8]. 
 78.  Id.; Interview with anonymous source 7 [hereinafter I-7]. 
 79.  Scholars have previously identified these due process problems without necessarily at-
tributing them to the informality of inter-agency coordination in parallel proceedings.  See, e.g., 
Renan, supra note 38, at 254–55 (analyzing how parallel proceedings “can enable criminal prose-
cutors . . . to collect information that the criminal investigators would not have been able to ob-
tain” and “enable regulatory agencies to operate without the legal constraints that attach to their 
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late this coordination.  The Supreme Court has recognized that, if conducted 
inappropriately or for the wrong reasons, parallel proceedings threaten due 
process.80  In two respects, however, the case law that has developed around 
this recognition has created something of a Potemkin doctrine.  First, the 
doctrine leaves unregulated many problematic practices.  Second, the prob-
lem that the doctrine does regulate rarely occurs.  Notwithstanding these 
concerns, there are both constitutional and prudential hurdles to using doc-
trine to address the due process harms that can arise from parallel proceed-
ings. 
1.  Unregulated Coordination 
Essentially, parallel proceedings are permissible unless the govern-
ment is using the civil action solely to build its criminal case or otherwise 
acts in bad faith.  Most federal regulatory agencies enjoy broad grants of 
statutory authority to share information with federal prosecutors, and are 
only limited in doing so by three relatively weak due process constraints.  
First, a federal agency cannot initiate a civil investigation for the sole pur-
pose of assisting a federal prosecutor’s criminal case.81  Second, civil regu-
lators may not affirmatively lie to defendants about the involvement of 
criminal authorities.82  Third, civil regulators cannot make discovery re-
quests that lack any plausible, independent basis other than to build a crimi-
nal case.83 
The foundations of this doctrine were established in United States v. 
Kordel,84 in which the defendants argued that prosecutors and regulators vi-
olated their due process rights by using the civil discovery process to build 
a criminal case.85  The Supreme Court rejected this argument, but suggested 
that parallel proceedings may violate due process when the Government (1) 
“has brought an action solely to obtain evidence for [a] criminal prosecu-
tion,” (2) “has failed to advise the defendant in its civil proceeding that it 
contemplates his criminal prosecution,” or (3) “other special circumstances 
that might suggest the unconstitutionality or even the impropriety of this 
                                                          
ordinary policymaking tools”); see also Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Rem-
edies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil 
Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1389–94 (1991); Shiv Narayan Persaud, Parallel Inves-
tigations Between Administrative and Law Enforcement Agencies: A Question of Civil Liberties, 
39 U. DAYTON L. REV. 77, 80 (2013). 
 80.  United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970). 
 81.  United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 938 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 82.  Id. at 940. 
 83.  Id. at 939. 
 84.  397 U.S. 1 (1970).  
 85.  Specifically, the Food and Drug Administration requested that the DOJ initiate criminal 
proceedings against certain defendants and provided the DOJ with the targets’ responses to a set 
of civil interrogatories.  Id. at 4–5. 
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criminal prosecution.”86  This language—particularly its invitation for 
courts to evaluate whether “special circumstances” led to a parallel proceed-
ing violating due process—suggests that federal courts could monitor and 
aggressively regulate the coordination of prosecutors and civil regulators.  
In practice, however, appellate courts have been reluctant to dive into the 
bureaucratic intricacies of how agencies conduct parallel investigations.87 
For a short period, courts stood willing to discipline prosecutors who 
“hid[] behind” civil investigations to obtain evidence, avoid criminal dis-
covery rules, or evade criminal procedure constraints.88  In United States v. 
Scrushy,89 for example, a federal district court suppressed an SEC deposi-
tion and dismissed the charges against a defendant because the govern-
ment’s civil and criminal investigations had “improperly merged.”90  In 
Scrushy, federal prosecutors requested that the SEC move the location of a 
civil deposition so that they could secure venue for a criminal prosecution 
based on any false statements that the defendant might make during his tes-
timony.91  At the prosecutors’ request, the SEC attempted to bolster the 
criminal case by asking certain questions and refraining from asking oth-
ers.92  The district court concluded that the prosecutors had “manipulated 
the simultaneous investigations for [their] own purposes,” and that the use 
of the deposition testimony would consequently “depart[] from the proper 
administration of justice.”93  Similarly, in United States v. Stringer,94 a dis-
trict court dismissed the defendants’ indictments on due process grounds 
because the SEC had affirmatively concealed the U.S. Attorney’s involve-
ment in a parallel investigation.95  The Stringer investigation involved col-
                                                          
 86.  Id. at 11–12.  The Court also suggested that a due process violation might occur in “a 
case where the defendant is without counsel or reasonably fears prejudice from adverse pretrial 
publicity or other unfair injury.”  Id. at 12. 
 87.  See, e.g., SEC v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc).  In 
Dresser, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia declined to regulate the sharing of in-
formation between the SEC and the Department of Justice.  Id. at 1309.  Endeavoring to quash an 
SEC subpoena, one of the defendants argued that the agency had “abuse[d] the civil discovery 
process . . . for the purpose of criminal discovery and infringe[d] the role of the grand jury in in-
dependently investigating allegations of criminal wrongdoing.”  Id. at 1370.  The court rejected 
the argument, and in doing so emphasized the SEC’s and DOJ’s broad statutory mandates to coor-
dinate in order to effectively enforce federal securities laws.  Id. at 1377. 
 88.  United States v. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1087 (D. Or. 2006), rev’d in part, vacat-
ed in part, United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 89.  366 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (N.D. Ala. 2005). 
 90.  Id. at 1137. 
 91.  Id. at 1138.  
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 1140.  DOJ officials have criticized Scrushy for its reliance on case law that pre-
dates Kordel, but the government’s appeal was dismissed after Scrushy was acquitted of all re-
maining counts of the indictment.  See Gray, supra note 5, at 45.  
 94.  408 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (D. Or. 2006). 
 95.  Id. at 1092–93. 
 2018] PARALLEL ENFORCEMENT 1001 
 
laboration between the SEC and the U.S. Attorney’s Office so close that 
prosecutors decided to forego any FBI investigation and instead relied ex-
clusively on the SEC’s work product.96  The U.S. Attorney’s Office chose 
not to “surface” at an early stage of the investigation so that they would not 
deter the defendants’ cooperation with the SEC.97  Rather than actively mis-
leading the defendant, however, the SEC provided him with a form which 
advised that the SEC “often makes its files available to other governmental 
agencies, particularly United States Attorneys and state prosecutors.”98  
Notwithstanding this notice, the SEC instructed court reporters not to tell 
the defendants’ attorneys about the U.S. Attorney’s involvement and was 
evasive when asked whether one of the defendants was the target of a crim-
inal investigation.99  The district court concluded that this “strategy to con-
ceal the criminal investigation from defendants was an abuse of the [dis-
covery] process.”100 
Ultimately, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision in String-
er, and in doing so entrenched a regulatory structure that grants prosecutors 
and civil regulators substantial discretion to coordinate their investigations 
to best fit their needs.101  The court held that the government honored its ob-
ligations under Kordel notwithstanding the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s deci-
sion not to disclose its involvement in the case.102  In the court’s view, the 
fact that the SEC began its civil investigation before reaching out to prose-
cutors tended to “negate any likelihood that the government began the civil 
investigation in bad faith.”103  Because the SEC interviewed defendants to 
support a “bona fide civil investigation,” the court held that there was no 
due process violation.104  Additionally, the court held that the SEC’s routine 
provision of a form provided defendants with adequate notice that they 
might be exposed to criminal liability, and that the defendants therefore 
                                                          
 96.  Id. at 1085–86. 
 97.  Id. at 1086. 
 98.  SEC, FORM 1662, SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR PERSONS REQUESTED TO SUPPLY 
INFORMATION VOLUNTARILY OR DIRECTED TO SUPPLY INFORMATION PURSUANT TO A 
COMMISSION SUBPOENA 3 (Aug. 2016), https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/sec1662.pdf; see 
Stringer 408 F. Supp. 2d at 1086–87.  Other agencies provide similar warnings that the infor-
mation they collect may be used in criminal or civil proceedings.  See, e.g., EPA Parallel Proceed-
ings Memo, supra note 39 
 (“[A]lthough not a legal requirement, it is a common EPA practice to include a warning in EPA 
information requests that all information sought may be used in an administrative, civil judicial or 
criminal action.”). 
 99.  Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 1086-87. 
 100.  Id. at 1088. 
 101.  United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 102.  Id. at 942. 
 103.  Id. at 939. 
 104.  Id. 
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waived their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by testifying 
during the SEC investigation.105 
The court thus embraced a reading of Kordel according to which paral-
lel proceedings are permissible as long as (1) the civil investigation is not a 
pretext for the criminal one and (2) the government does not affirmatively 
lie about a prosecutor’s involvement.  Specifically, Stringer ensures that 
civil regulators can guard against judicial intervention by providing defend-
ants with a pro forma notification that the regulator may share the fruits of 
their discovery with criminal authorities.  If the investigation was initiated 
by civil enforcers—thus ensuring that investigation was not brought “solely 
to obtain evidence” for a criminal case—the government is virtually en-
sured against reversal of a parallel investigation.106  Thus, the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s Stringer decision virtually eliminates the “special circumstances” in-
quiry that permitted courts to scrutinize the coordination practices of 
regulators and prosecutors. 
2.  Doctrinal Misfires 
While leaving most aspects of the prosecutor-regulator relationship un-
touched, the doctrine governing parallel proceedings addresses due process 
problems that rarely arise.  Specifically, the doctrine prevents regulators 
from either (1) making strategic choices solely to build a criminal case or 
(2) actively misleading a defendant about a prosecutor’s involvement in an 
investigation.  (As a helpful shorthand, one might call these “Scrushy viola-
tions.”). 
The prosecutors and regulators I interviewed were familiar with their 
obligations under Scrushy and Stringer and took them seriously.107  They 
also reported, however, that Scrushy violations are now virtually non-
existent and, at their worst, tended to occur in “outlying” U.S. Attorneys 
Offices that lacked substantial experience with parallel proceedings.108  
                                                          
 105.  Id. at 937–39.  The court also rejected the defendants’ Fourth Amendment argument that 
their consent to participate in the civil investigation was obtained by trickery or deceit.  See id. at 
940–41.  
 106.  United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970). 
 107.  For example, parallel investigations are attractive to prosecutors seeking foreign records 
because civil regulators are able to gain access to such materials with far greater ease than their 
criminal counterparts.  Specifically, civil regulators are able to obtain records from foreign regula-
tory authorities through the multilateral IOSCO Memorandum of Understanding.  Thus, by coop-
erating with civil regulators, prosecutors can gain access to foreign records more efficiently than if 
they were required to obtain the records under the terms of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 
(“MLAT”).  Civil regulators are mindful, however, that they may only seek out records that they 
have an independent basis for acquiring.  This constraint places regulators in the position of occa-
sionally denying a prosecutor’s request for documents that the agency has no independent basis 
for obtaining.  Interview with anonymous source 14 [hereinafter I-14]. 
 108.  I-2; Interview with anonymous source 6 [hereinafter I-6]; I-7. 
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More experienced U.S. Attorneys Offices, by contrast, tend to rely on their 
own investigative resources rather than hide behind civil investigations.109  
These accounts seem credible given that none of the white-collar defense 
attorneys I interviewed were able to recall any case in which federal prose-
cutors or regulators behaved as they did in Scrushy.110 
One might argue that the extreme rarity of Scrushy violations attests to 
the success of the doctrine.111  Certainly, one should not discount the indi-
rect ways in which Scrushy and Stringer may have influenced prosecutors 
and regulators.  For example, the decisions led the DOJ to train both its own 
attorneys and outside regulators concerning their due process obligations in 
parallel proceedings.112  The doctrine may have also reinforced the trans-
parency norms that are a hallmark of the SEC’s enforcement practice.113  
For example, an experienced defense attorney reported that he was on the 
verge of settling a case with admissions with the SEC.114  Before the settle-
                                                          
 109.  I-1; I-2; I-6. 
 110.  I-2; I-6; Interview with anonymous source 11 [hereinafter I-11].  Scrushy problems also 
rarely appear in state courts.  Attorneys certainly may encounter unprofessional behavior in state 
parallel proceedings, such as a prosecutor “showing up” unannounced at a civil settlement meet-
ing.  For example, one experienced New York litigator has encountered what he deems to be un-
professional behavior wherein a county prosecutor became involved in a state legislative ethics 
investigation involving a defendant who did not reside in the prosecutor’s district and was not a 
member of the prosecutor’s political party.  Interview with anonymous source 10 [hereinafter I-
10].  At the state and local level, however, authorities often lack the ability to benefit from hiding 
behind a civil investigation to the degree that federal prosecutors are able.  In New York, for ex-
ample, the evidentiary rules governing the grand jury prevent the use of hearsay evidence and thus 
tend to give defendants greater insight into the government’s case.  Moreover, the state lacks a 
false statements charge equivalent to 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which eliminates the incentive for civil 
regulators to ask questions in depositions that are designed to elicit such a charge.  Thus, as an 
attorney with policymaking experience in the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office observed, a 
county prosecutor in New York “doesn’t have the toolkit” to use civil investigations to circumvent 
criminal procedure protections.  Interview with anonymous source 3 [hereinafter I-3]. 
 111.  Cf. Shelby City, v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 590 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Throw-
ing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes 
is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.”). 
 112.  See Holder Memo, supra note 42, n.1 (“When conducting parallel investigations, De-
partment attorneys should be mindful of arguments like those raised in Stringer and . . . 
Scrushy . . . .  The Department has provided and will continue to provide training opportunities to 
assist civil and criminal attorneys, and joint training with agency attorneys, in evaluating these 
issues.”). 
 113.  I-2; see also Interview by William Thomas with Richard Walker, Former Dir., SEC, at 45 
(Mar. 14, 2015), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-
5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/oral-
histories/20150514_Walker_Richard_T.pdf (contrasting the institutional norms of the FBI and the 
SEC and observing: “The Commission was very restricted . . . in terms of the notifications it 
would have to give to people that it was seeking information from.  Basically, ‘I work for the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, the information you give me could be used for thousands of 
purposes.’”). 
 114.  That is, the attorney’s client was willing to admit wrongdoing as part of the settlement 
agreement. 
 1004 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:985 
 
ment was finalized, however, the agency learned that a U.S. Attorney’s Of-
fice was interested in picking up the case.  The SEC called the attorney to 
advise him of the development and offered to end the settlement negotia-
tions (and thereby put the case on hold).  The attorney speculates that the 
SEC’s candor was motivated by a cautious interpretation of the agency’s 
obligations under Stringer and Scrushy (and perhaps also by a desire to pre-
serve the agency’s credibility in future settlement negotiations).115 
The rarity of such violations, however, seems to be the result of insti-
tutional design choices that have little to do with any judicial pronounce-
ments.  For a Scrushy violation to occur, an inexperienced (or overzealous) 
prosecutor must be paired with a naïve and poorly supervised regulator.  
One former senior officer at the SEC indicated that, even prior to Scrushy 
and Stringer, senior leadership in the Enforcement Division disapproved of 
the practice of federal prosecutors hiding behind SEC investigations.116  A 
Scrushy violation thus involves a deviation from the norms and values that 
the agency uses to assess the performance of its staff attorneys.  Such devia-
tions are likely to be rare given the relatively hierarchical nature of the 
regulatory enforcement agencies that frequently pursue parallel proceed-
ings.117  As one experienced defense attorney explained, “there is a stark 
difference in negotiating with the SEC as compared to criminal prosecutors.  
It seems that when you have a case with the SEC, the entire staff is in-
volved. You don’t often get that sense when you’re working with a prosecu-
tor’s office.  Certainly, most investigations are not on the desk of the U.S. 
Attorney himself or herself.”118 
Moreover, reforms in the SEC and the CFTC have made Scrushy prob-
lems even more improbable.  The effective coordination of parallel pro-
ceedings requires civil regulators to defer to the judgment and expertise of 
prosecutors with respect to criminal investigatory questions.119  In outlier 
cases such as Scrushy, such deference is misplaced.120  However, with some 
exposure to the appropriate norms of criminal prosecutions—or by working 
under the oversight of attorneys familiar with those norms—a civil regula-
tor will recognize the circumstances in which a prosecutor is trying to ex-
ploit civil discovery for purposes that do not serve the regulator’s inter-
ests.121  In recent years, both the SEC and the CFTC have hired former 
                                                          
 115.  I-9. 
 116.  I-2. 
 117.  See Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 658–60 
(2002); see also infra Part I.B (describing the SEC’s and CFTC’s formal oversight mechanisms 
over criminal referral decisions). 
 118.  I-10. 
 119.  I-5. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
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prosecutors to run their Enforcement Divisions and recruited former prose-
cutors to staff those divisions.122  Thus, both agencies have increased the 
number of regulators on staff who are adept at recognizing outlier cases 
where deference to prosecutors is inappropriate.123 
C.  Judicial Reluctance to Monitor 
An obvious response to doctrine that fails to address serious due pro-
cess concerns is to call for new and better doctrine.124  Leaving aside the 
merits of this approach, it would be difficult to persuade courts to adopt 
rules that would adequately address the due process concerns raised by aca-
demics and lawyers.125  There are at least two reasons why courts have been 
reluctant to strengthen the relatively lax framework governing parallel pro-
ceedings. 
First, to regulate coordination between prosecutors and regulators, 
courts would have to constrain executive discretion in ways that raise both 
separation-of-powers and judicial manageability concerns.  A court would 
be hard pressed, for example, to regulate the timing of cases in order to pre-
vent prosecutors and regulators from bringing them in tandem.  This is be-
cause the Supreme Court has held that prosecutors may delay an indictment 
for a considerable length of time to build an investigation.126  This hold-
                                                          
 122.  For example, the CFTC’s current Enforcement Director and one of the SEC’s Co-
Directors of Enforcement were Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the Southern District of New York.  
See Press Release, SEC, SEC Names Stephanie Avakian and Steven Peikin as Co-Directors of 
Enforcement (June 8, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-113 (“From 1996 to 
2004, Mr. Peikin served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York.”); 
Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Acting Chairman Giancarlo Appoints James McDonald as Enforce-
ment Director (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7541-17 (“Mr. 
McDonald joins the CFTC from the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, 
where he served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney and most recently in the Public Corruption Unit.”).   
 123.  Consistent with this assessment, an attorney familiar with the CFTC’s enforcement prac-
tices confirmed that the agency is able to, and on occasion does, reject prosecutors’ requests for 
the regulators to seek out information that the agency had no independent civil basis for request-
ing.  I-8. 
 124.  A court could hold, for example, that prosecutors infringe on the traditional investigatory 
role of the grand jury by coordinating with regulators to gather evidence through the civil discov-
ery process.  But see SEC v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) 
(rejecting this argument).  Alternatively, a court could rule that civil regulators cannot review ma-
terial obtained by prosecutors without threatening the “fundamental maxim of discovery that 
‘[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litiga-
tion.’”  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 
522, 540 n.25 (1987) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1949)) (alteration in origi-
nal). 
 125.  See supra note 79. 
 126.  United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 795 (1977) (holding that prosecutors may not 
delay an indictment “solely ‘to gain tactical advantage over the accused,’” but may do so for the 
purpose of building an investigation (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971))). 
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ing—which is rooted in separation-of-powers concerns127—effectively 
gives prosecutors the power to delay a criminal case in order to benefit from 
the civil discovery they could obtain from a parallel proceeding.  A court 
would also encounter doctrinal obstacles if it sought to regulate the type of 
cases that prosecutors and regulators brought as parallel proceedings.  On 
the criminal side, charging decisions are effectively unreviewable unless 
they are obviously motivated by invidious discrimination.128  It would there-
fore be a doctrinal aberration to inquire whether, in a parallel proceeding 
context, a prosecutor had improperly filed criminal charges in order to pres-
sure a defendant to accept a civil settlement.129  On the civil side, the Su-
preme Court has refused to engage in programmatic oversight of agency en-
forcement policies due to separation-of-powers concerns about judicial 
oversight of the inter-workings of executive agencies.130  For the same rea-
son, courts have declined to monitor agency decisions not to bring particu-
lar enforcement actions.131  These decisions leave courts without the doctri-
nal resources to easily monitor the relationships between prosecutors and 
regulators in the parallel proceedings context. 
Second, even when acknowledging potential due process concerns, 
courts have treated parallel proceedings as essential to a well-functioning 
regulatory state.  In Kordel, for example, the Supreme Court stressed that 
effective civil enforcement requires the government to be able to proceed 
expeditiously with regulatory investigations while reserving the ability to 
pursue criminal charges.132  It would therefore “stultify enforcement of fed-
                                                          
 127.  See id. at 790 (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit courts to abort criminal prose-
cutions simply because they disagree with a prosecutor’s judgment as to when to seek an indict-
ment.  Judges are not free, in defining ‘due process,’ to impose on law enforcement officials our 
‘personal and private notions’ of fairness and to ‘disregard the limits that bind judges in their judi-
cial function.’” (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952))). 
 128.  See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–68 (1996); Wayte v. United States, 
470 U.S. 598, 607–10 (1985). 
 129.  Cf. Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987) (upholding a plea agreement that required a 
criminal defendant to forfeit his right to file a civil suit in exchange for a prosecutor’s dismissal of 
criminal charges). 
 130.  See Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(2011); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985); J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, 
The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1453 (2003).  
 131.  See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 (interpreting the Administrative Procedure Act to bar judi-
cial review of non-enforcement decisions).  
 132.  See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970).  The Court noted, 
The public interest in protecting consumers throughout the Nation from misbranded 
drugs requires prompt action by the agency charged with responsibility for administra-
tion of the federal food and drug laws.  But a rational decision whether to proceed crim-
inally against those responsible for the misbranding may have to await consideration of 
a fuller record than that before the agency at the time of the civil seizure of the offend-
ing products. 
Id. 
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eral law to require a governmental agency . . . invariably to choose either to 
forgo recommendation of a criminal prosecution once it seeks civil relief, or 
to defer civil proceedings pending the ultimate outcome of a criminal tri-
al.”133  This stultification could work in at least two ways.  First, overzeal-
ous monitoring might require civil regulators to forego the possibility of 
criminal prosecution in order to obtain a civil judgment.134  Second, it might 
“endanger[]” a criminal prosecution by forcing prosecutors to await the res-
olution of a civil proceeding before pursuing their case.135 
In light of these concerns, courts give prosecutors and regulators con-
siderable discretion to decide which combination of civil and criminal in-
vestigatory techniques and remedies will best insure that they reach their 
desired outcome in the matter before them.  In SEC v. Dresser Industries, 
Inc.,136 for example, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that federal securities laws 
broadly authorized the SEC and the DOJ to coordinate as they deemed nec-
essary.137  It would contravene this statutory mandate, the court reasoned, if 
the SEC were limited in its ability to transmit information to the DOJ that it 
obtained through civil discovery.138  This doctrine thus incentivizes modes 
of cooperation that are designed to maximize the government’s freedom to 
choose the combination of civil and criminal investigatory techniques that 
best fits their needs in a particular case. 
II.  SYSTEMIC RISKS OF PARALLEL ENFORCEMENT 
The doctrinal framework governing parallel proceedings enables regu-
lators to accomplish their enforcement goals with great efficiency but also 
creates opportunities for abuse.139  Beyond facilitating individual instances 
of misconduct, however, parallel enforcement may create systemic prob-
lems both for regulators and those they target.  A full account of such risks 
                                                          
 133.  Id. 
 134.  See id. 
 135.  SEC. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Kordel, 628 
U.S. at 12); see id. (“The SEC cannot always wait for Justice to complete the criminal proceedings 
if it is to obtain the necessary prompt civil remedy; neither can Justice always await the conclu-
sion of the civil proceeding without endangering its criminal case.  Thus we should not block par-
allel investigations by these agencies in the absence of ‘special circumstances’ in which the nature 
of the proceedings demonstrably prejudices substantial rights of the investigated party or of the 
government.” (citing Kordel 628 U.S. at 11–13)). 
 136.  628 F.2d 1368 (1980) (en banc). 
 137.  Id. at 1385. 
 138.  More precisely, the en banc court reversed the decision of a three-judge panel ordering 
that “once the Justice Department initiates criminal proceedings by means of a grand jury, the 
SEC may not provide the Justice Department with the fruits of the Commission’s civil discovery 
gathered after the decision to prosecute.”  Id. (quoting slip op. at 22).  
 139.  See, e.g., United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (N.D. Ala. 2005); supra notes 
89–99 and accompanying text. 
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is beyond the scope of this fundamentally descriptive Article.  To demon-
strate why a descriptive theory of parallel enforcement is necessary, howev-
er, it is worth highlighting two systemic risks that overlapping civil and 
criminal enforcement may create.  For agencies, parallel enforcement may 
distort enforcement priorities in ways that, over time, serve to reduce the 
agencies’ regulatory effectiveness.  For defendants, parallel enforcement 
creates information asymmetries that threaten core due process rights. 
A.  Regulatory Distortion 
Courts sometimes treat parallel enforcement as necessary to ensure 
that civil regulators are free to pursue their independent enforcement 
goals.140  Left unconsidered, however, is the degree to which parallel en-
forcement may shape those enforcement goals.  In other words, the availa-
bility of parallel proceedings and an agency’s selection of enforcement 
goals may be endogenous variables.  As such, parallel enforcement has the 
potential to distort the enforcement decisions of civil regulators.  Specifical-
ly, as this Article shows, criminal charges can dramatically reduce the costs 
and effort required to pursue a civil regulatory action.141  An effective sys-
tem of civil regulation, however, may require agencies to sanction conduct 
that is not criminal.  The prospect of parallel proceedings may lead civil 
regulators to ignore such conduct in order to concentrate their resources on 
cases that are likely to support criminal charges, and are thus easier to liti-
gate. 
This argument turns on the distinction between the appropriate goals 
of civil and criminal enforcement.  Several scholars recognized that there is 
a troubling under-theorization of the respective and distinct goals of civil 
and criminal enforcement in American law.142  Nevertheless, administrative 
law scholars have identified at least two significant justifications—an “eco-
nomic” model and a “responsive regulation” model—for civil regulation.143  
                                                          
 140.  See, e.g., United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970).  The Court noted, 
The public interest in protecting consumers throughout the Nation from misbranded 
drugs requires prompt action by the agency charged with responsibility for administra-
tion of the federal food and drug laws. . . .  It would stultify enforcement of federal law 
to require a governmental agency such as the FDA invariably to choose either to forgo 
recommendation of a criminal prosecution once it seeks civil relief, or to defer civil 
proceedings pending the ultimate outcome of a criminal trial. 
Id. 
 141.  See infra Part III. 
 142.  Daniel C. Richman, Overcriminalization for Lack of Better Options: A Celebration of 
Bill Stuntz, in THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES OF 
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ 64 (Michael Klarman et al. eds., (2012)); see also DOUGLAS HUSAK, 
OVERCRIMINALIZATION 58 (2008). 
 143.  Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 859–62 (2012).  
Professor Minzner—who is currently general counsel to the chairman of the Federal Energy Regu-
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Both of these justifications suggest that civil regulators should pursue cases 
that do not overlap perfectly with those being pursued by their criminal 
counterparts. 
Under an economic model, civil regulators will make enforcement de-
cisions that will deter socially undesirable activities.144  If there is an over-
lapping system of civil and criminal regulations, this goal should lead regu-
lators to investigate and punish socially harmful conduct that will fall below 
the threshold for criminal action.  According to one deterrence framework, 
civil regulators should make enforcement decisions that require wrongdoers 
to internalize the costs of any harm their conduct imposes on others.145  This 
framework assumes that wrongdoers will commit social harms if the gain 
from doing so outweighs the probability of being detected multiplied by the 
fine that would be imposed if the harm were detected.  Accordingly, when it 
detects wrongdoing, an agency should pursue a fine f that is equal to h/p, 
where h is the harm that a defendant caused and p is the probability that 
regulators will detect such harms.146  If civil regulators routinely disregard 
harms that are not capable of sustaining criminal charges, then the probabil-
ity of detection for those harms would fall dramatically.  Thus, if a civil 
regulator were to make enforcement decisions that perfectly reflected the 
priorities of criminal prosecutors, the regulator would incentivize wide-
spread wrongdoing.147 
An alternative model of “responsive regulation,” advanced by Ian 
Ayres and John Braithwaite, assumes that a potential wrongdoer is not mo-
tivated solely by economic motives.148  Rather, a regulated actor is likely to 
be influenced by reputational considerations, a sense of social responsibil-
ity, and a range of other contextually specific incentives.149  Accordingly, a 
regulator should carefully tailor its sanctions based on the motivations of 
actors and the norms under which they operate.150  Significantly, this model 
                                                          
latory Commission—contends that, in practice, civil regulators make their enforcement decisions 
based on retributive considerations that lie outside their core expertise.  See id. at 904–13.  
 144.  Id. at 859–60. 
 145.  See id.  
 146.  See Minzer, supra note 143, at 860; see also Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 190–93 (1968).  Law and economics scholars take 
this to be the purpose of criminal law as well.  See id; Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Penalties 
and the Economics of Criminal Law, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 175, 177–78 (2005); Richard A. Posner, 
An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1195–96, 1205 (1985). 
 147.  Moreover, with respect to the criminal-level harms that the regulator chooses to pursue, a 
cost-internalization framework suggests that the regulator may over-deter socially beneficial con-
duct if they fail to coordinate with prosecutors to ensure that they collectively impose a penalty 
that does not exceed h/p.  This framework is described in Minzer, supra note 143, at 860. 
 148.  IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1995). 
 149.  Id. at 4–5 (1995); Minzner, supra note 143, at 861–62. 
 150.  AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 148, at 4–5. 
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acknowledges the possibility that “[r]egulations themselves can affect struc-
ture . . . and can affect motivations of the regulated.”151  In order to respond 
to the motivations of a diverse set of actors, regulators should have a range 
of sanctions available to them.  A regulator might be well served to begin 
with efforts to “coax compliance by persuasion” and then to gradually esca-
late its enforcement based on the degree to which the targeted actor is coop-
erative.152  Significantly, however, an actor is less likely to cooperate with a 
regulator who has one, severe penalty available to them.153 
This model suggests that a civil regulator will not be effective if it 
gains a reputation for referring every case for criminal charges.  Such a rep-
utation will be ineffective for at least two reasons.  First, if the agency fo-
cuses only on egregious actors—those actors who are truly deserving of 
criminal sanction—then it will miss the opportunity to undertake low-cost 
enforcement actions that will improve the behavior of well-meaning actors 
who are mistaken about their regulatory obligations.  Second, if the agency 
expands the scope of its enforcement and refers well-meaning actors to 
criminal authorities, it could shape the incentives of those actors in ways 
that lead it to cause more social harms.  A well-motivated actor who is mis-
taken about its regulatory obligations may “dig in his heels and fight” if 
treated as a criminal.154  The same actor, by contrast, might show remorse 
and a desire to self-correct if exposed to relatively light sanctions.155 
Thus, parallel proceedings have the potential to shape an agency’s en-
forcement priorities in ways that cannot be justified under traditional theo-
ries of regulation.  The availability of parallel proceedings will not be prob-
lematic if a civil regulator sets its enforcement priorities without regard to 
whether it can avail itself of the benefits of coordinating with prosecutors.  
However, if an agency begins to prioritize cases because they can be re-
ferred to criminal authorities, then it will make enforcement decisions that 
are likely to exacerbate the social harms they are seeking to correct. 
It is difficult to assess whether a civil regulatory agency has allowed 
the prospect of parallel enforcement to improperly shape its enforcement 
decisions.  There is circumstantial evidence, however, suggesting that poli-
cymakers should be sensitive to this concern.  Understandably, some regu-
latory agencies find it beneficial from a deterrence perspective to signal that 
there is a high probability that a criminal case is likely to stem from its civil 
investigation.  These signals, however, are not necessarily costless.  For ex-
ample, since 2003, it has been a top priority to cooperate with criminal au-
                                                          
 151.  Id. at 4. 
 152.  Id. at 35–36.  
 153.  Id. at 36. 
 154.  Id. at 48. 
 155.  Id.  
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thorities in order to facilitate prosecutions.156  From a regulatory perspec-
tive, there are sensible reasons for this approach.  First, given its resource 
constraints, the CFTC appears to prioritize the most serious fraud cases—
which by their nature involve some type of criminal activity.  For example, 
one insider estimates that, in recent years, a substantial portion of the 
CFTC’s enforcement docket has involved some type of Ponzi scheme that 
would naturally give rise to criminal charges.157  Of the remaining cases on 
the docket, some were the sort of high-impact and high-profile cases that 
criminal prosecutors would be eager to pursue.  For example, the CFTC has 
enhanced its stature in recent years by successfully pursuing cases in the 
wake of the LIBOR scandal,158 the FX (or forex) scandal,159 and the col-
lapse of Jon Corzine’s MF Global.160  This case prioritization undoubtedly 
has significant deterrent benefits, and may reflect the best option for an un-
der-funded regulatory agency. 
At the same time, the aggressive use of criminal referrals may suggest 
that an agency’s enforcement priorities require further consideration.  Sev-
eral attorneys familiar with the CFTC’s enforcement practices confirm that, 
prior to about 2011, the CFTC referred virtually every single case (other 
than those involving routine reporting violations) to criminal authorities.161  
As one attorney with considerable CFTC experience framed it, prior to 
about six years ago, the CFTC would refer virtually every case and hoped 
that a U.S. Attorney’s office would work it.162  Sources familiar with the 
CFTC maintain that, since then, the agency has taken a more discerning ap-
proach to referrals with the goal of ensuring that federal prosecutors have 
the capacity and will to pursue a case.163  Even as recently as Fiscal Year 
2015, however, approximately ninety percent of the CFTC Enforcement 
Division’s major fraud and manipulation cases—that is, fraud and manipu-
lation cases in which the customer losses or market impact exceeded $1 
                                                          
 156.  I-8. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  See Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Orders The Royal Bank of Scotland to Pay $85 Million 
Penalty for Attempted Manipulation of U.S. Dollar ISDAFIX Benchmark Swap Rates (Feb. 3, 
2017), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7527-17 (describing the CFTC’s LIBOR 
benchmark abuse cases).  
 159.  See id. (describing the CFTC’s foreign exchange benchmark abuse cases).  
 160.  See Press Release, CFTC, Federal Court in New York Orders Jon S. Corzine to Pay $5 
Million Penalty for his Role in MF Global’s Unlawful Use of Nearly $1 Billion of Customer 
Funds and Prohibits Corzine from Registering with the CFTC in any Capacity or Associating with 
an FCM (Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7508-17. 
 161.  I-7; I-8. 
 162.  I-7. 
 163.  Id.; I-8. 
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million in value (a relatively low threshold)—involved parallel proceed-
ings.164 
Whether or not it is true, however, a ninety percent referral rate may 
signal to potential wrongdoers that an agency is selecting cases because 
they can be referred for criminal prosecution, while disregarding important 
cases that do not reach the criminal threshold.165  For example, the Dodd-
Frank Act recently lowered the scienter requirement of the Commodity Ex-
change Act (“CEA”) so that the statute now prohibits reckless fraud and 
manipulation in the commodities markets.166  A criminal violation of the 
CEA, however, requires the government to prove a specific intent to de-
fraud or manipulate the market.167  It is difficult to ascertain whether, since 
the passage of Dodd-Frank, the CFTC has regularly used its newfound au-
thority to select cases that involve reckless market manipulation but which, 
prior to further investigation, did not appear to involve criminal conduct.  
However, the occasional pursuit of such a case would send a signal that on-
ly the most egregious wrongdoers are at risk of regulatory enforcement. 
B.  Information Asymmetries 
Parallel enforcement creates the opportunity for both civil and criminal 
agencies to circumvent the procedural rules and protections that have re-
spectively been designed for each regime.  The practice thus enables both 
civil and criminal regulators to avoid many of the institutional and doctrinal 
constraints that traditionally shape their decisionmaking.  For defendants, 
this framework generates information asymmetries that raise significant due 
process concerns.168  Specifically, parallel proceedings exacerbate infor-
                                                          
 164.  See Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Releases Annual Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 
2016 (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7274-15; I-8.  
 165.  At least one attorney familiar with the CFTC’s enforcement practices disagrees strenu-
ously with this claim and observes that in the last five years the agency has filed market-impacting 
cases that do not have a criminal component.  I-8.  This attorney cited the CFTC’s market manipu-
lation pending case against Donald Wilson and DRW Investments as a significant case that did not 
have a criminal component.  See Complaint, CFTC v. Wilson, No. 13-cv-7884 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 
2013), ECF No. 1. 
 166.  17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2012).  
 167.  7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(5) (2012). 
 168.  Parallel proceedings impose other costs on defendants that do not necessarily raise ques-
tions of fairness or due process.  For example, multiple defense attorneys reported that civil liabil-
ity considerations significantly influence the information that they choose to produce in order to 
cooperate with a criminal investigation. I-4; I-6; I-11.  As one defense attorney explained, “If 
there’s no threat of private civil action, then you can collect your worst documents in a binder and 
show that there’s no criminal case.  But then you’ve possibly made the civil case for someone.”  I-
4.  This problem is exacerbated by the fact that an effective response to a civil regulatory investi-
gation may require the defendant to create documents that could prove damaging in a criminal 
case.  As one experienced securities fraud litigator observed, when responding to SEC requests in 
a parallel investigation context, he is “often less concerned with the testimony that a client may 
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mation asymmetries between defendants and prosecutors that result from 
our criminal discovery rules, and create new information asymmetries that 
are antithetical to our civil discovery system.169 
While the federal rules of civil procedure are famously expansive, the 
rules of criminal procedure impose very few reciprocal discovery obliga-
tions.170  Both prosecutors and civil regulators can exploit this differential to 
deepen their informational advantages in parallel proceedings.171  On the 
criminal side, prosecutors can use parallel proceedings to obtain evidence 
that civil regulators have gathered through the civil discovery process.  
Practitioners have regularly and publicly accused prosecutors of engaging 
in the “frequent practice” of using “regulatory investigations, especially by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as stalking horses to gath-
er evidence for the criminal investigation.”172  Regardless of whether this is 
the core purpose of parallel proceedings, it is possible in light of the DOJ’s 
policy to proceed with such investigations “in a manner that allows infor-
mation to be shared to the fullest extent appropriate to the case and permis-
sible by law.”173 
In parallel proceedings, this information-gathering process often is 
asymmetrical.  As David Sklansky and Stephen Yeazell have observed, 
criminal discovery typically “relies on each party’s own investigations and 
subsequent disclosures by that party, rather than on the mutual adversarial 
probing characteristic of civil process.”174  Through parallel enforcement, 
however, criminal authorities benefit from the probing of civil discovery 
without necessarily having to assume the burdens of mutual disclosure. 
                                                          
provide than by the proliferation of statements and documents” that result from cooperation with 
the agency.  I-11. 
 169.  See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522, 540 n.25 (1987) (discussing “the fundamental maxim of discovery that ‘[m]utual 
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation’” (quot-
ing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947))); Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness the In-
formation Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1091 (2014) (identifying and criticiz-
ing information disparities in criminal discovery); David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, 
Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, 
and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 713–18 (2006) (comparing how these procedural asymmetries 
shape criminal discovery practice). 
 170.  Erin Murphy, The Mismatch Between Twenty-First-Century Forensic Evidence and Our 
Antiquated Criminal Justice System, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 633, 645 n.45 (2014) (comparing the 
scope of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 and FED. R. CIV. P. 26); Andrew E. Taslitz, Prosecutorial Precondi-
tions to Negotiations “Voluntary” Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 23 CRIM. JUST. 14, 20 
(2008). 
 171.  Two articles that touch on this possibility without systemically analyzing the problem as 
being one of asymmetry are Cheh, supra note 79, and Persaud, supra note 79. 
 172.  David Gourevitch & Richard M. Gelb, Government Manipulation of Regulatory and 
Criminal Investigations: A New Judicial Willingness to Scrutinize, 16 SEC. LITIG. J. 1, 1 (2016).  
 173.  Holder Memo, supra note 42. 
 174.  Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 169, at 713. 
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Prosecutorial access to information does not necessarily create due 
process concerns when it is reciprocal.  One commonly invoked justifica-
tion for defendants’ circumscribed discovery in criminal cases is the mutu-
ality of obligation: the defendant’s constitutional prerogative not to speak 
justifies reciprocal limitations on the evidence that the government makes 
available.175  Theoretically, one could expand the discovery obligations in 
criminal cases while maintaining this mutuality of obligation.  In some cas-
es, parallel proceedings may work in this fashion by subjecting the govern-
ment to civil discovery obligations that are relevant to their criminal prose-
cution.  This shift can—and sometimes does—work in the defendant’s 
favor.  For example, a defense attorney may be able to use the civil discov-
ery process to subpoena the cooperating witness in the government’s crimi-
nal case, and thus obtain information that would not otherwise be available 
to her.176  Indeed, in light of this access to discovery, one experienced de-
fense attorney reported that he sometimes welcomes the presence of a civil 
regulator if his client is facing criminal charges.177 
The discovery obligations in parallel proceedings, however, often are 
far from mutual.  An asymmetry stems, in part, from uncertainty on the de-
fendant’s part as to whether civil and criminal regulators are cooperating on 
a particular case.  In order to effectively use civil discovery to develop a 
criminal defense, an attorney will have to know that a criminal investigation 
is underway and have some sense of the nature of that investigation.  (For 
example, to use civil discovery to subpoena the cooperating witness in a 
criminal case, one must have some sense of what sort of criminal investiga-
tion might be underway and which witnesses are likely to feature in that 
case).  A party’s civil discovery rights, however, are limited to information 
that is relevant to the case at issue.178  Thus, a defendant cannot use civil 
discovery solely to ferret out information about possible criminal charges. 
Beyond this limitation, it often will be unclear whether a civil regula-
tor is coordinating with a prosecutor in contemplation of an indictment, and 
hence unclear whether the defendant should seek discovery relevant to a de-
fense against possible criminal charges.  Virtually every attorney I have in-
terviewed emphasized that experienced prosecutors do not actively “hide” 
behind civil regulatory investigations to gain the advantage of surprise.179  
Even when prosecutors do not actively conceal their interest in a case, how-
                                                          
 175.  For a discussion of how this asymmetry of obligation shaped drafting debates over the 
degree of discovery that should be permitted under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, with 
those advocating for limited discovery prevailing, see Ion Meyn, Why Civil and Criminal Proce-
dure Are So Different: A Forgotten History, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 720–24 (2017). 
 176.  I-6. 
 177.  I-11. 
 178.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 179.  See supra Part I.B.2. 
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ever, the ordinary protocols governing parallel proceedings may leave de-
fendants unaware of their involvement.  The SEC Enforcement Manual ad-
vises staff attorneys that, if asked about whether a criminal investigation is 
pending, they should do no more than “invite [the] person . . . to contact 
criminal authorities if they wish to pursue the question of whether there is a 
parallel criminal investigation.”180  Reaching out to the relevant criminal au-
thority—if you can accurately guess who it is181—will not necessarily prove 
beneficial.  A call to prosecutors could theoretically yield information if a 
client were the “target” of a criminal investigation.182  (The U.S. Attorneys’ 
Manual “encourage[s]” federal prosecutors to notify individuals if they are 
the “target” of an investigation and requires them to do so if the target is a 
grand jury witness).183  However, among different U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, 
“practices vary about the details they disclose” as to whether a case is pend-
ing.184  Notably, some U.S. Attorneys’ Offices with sophisticated parallel 
enforcement experience will decline to designate someone as a “target” pri-
                                                          
 180.  SEC, supra note 60, § 5.2.1.  This directive states: 
If asked by counsel or any individual whether there is a parallel criminal investigation, 
staff should direct counsel or the individual to the section of Form 1662 dealing with 
“Routine Uses of Information,” and state that it is the general policy of the Commission 
not to comment on investigations conducted by law enforcement authorities responsible 
for enforcing criminal laws.  Staff should also invite any person who raises such issues 
to contact criminal authorities if they wish to pursue the question of whether there is a 
parallel criminal investigation.  Should counsel or the individual ask which criminal au-
thorities they should contact, staff should decline to answer unless authorized by the 
relevant criminal authorities. 
Id.  Form 1662, which is provided to defendants who are given a Wells notice, states that: 
The Commission often makes its files available to other government agencies, particu-
larly United States Attorneys and state prosecutors.  There is a likelihood that infor-
mation supplied by you will be made available to such agencies where appropriate.  
Whether or not the Commission makes its files available to other government agencies 
is, in general, a confidential matter between the Commission and such governmental 
agencies.  
SEC, supra note 98, at 3. 
 181.  The SEC Enforcement Manual further instructs: “Should counsel or the individual ask 
which criminal authorities they should contact, staff should decline to answer unless authorized by 
the relevant criminal authorities.”  SEC, supra note 60, § 5.2.1. 
 182.  The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual defines a “target” of an investigation as “a person as to 
whom the prosecutor or the grand jury has substantial evidence linking him or her to the commis-
sion of a crime and who, in the judgment of the prosecutor, is a putative defendant.”  U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, supra note 46, § 9-11.151. 
 183.  See id. §§ 9-11.151, 9-11.153. 
 184.  I-4. 
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or to filing an indictment.185  The Southern District of New York, for exam-
ple, reportedly “never gives target letters when people ask for them.”186 
Thus, in some cases civil regulators will freely transmit information to 
prosecutors whose interest in the case remains unknown to the defendant.  
This information gap is particularly acute for defendants who are unable to 
afford the relatively small number of white-collar defense attorneys with 
significant experience as a regulator or as a federal prosecutor working on 
complex fraud cases.187  Even among these elite defense attorneys, howev-
er, there is no consensus as to whether it is appropriate or useful to inquire 
into whether a regulator is cooperating with a federal prosecutor.  Accord-
ing to one experienced defense attorney and former prosecutor, “a good at-
torney always asks whether a [criminal] referral has been made” and some-
times even the SEC will confirm that it has (notwithstanding the guidance 
in the SEC Enforcement Manual).188  By contrast, a comparably experi-
enced defense attorney, who is also a former prosecutor, seems to avoid any 
direct inquiry as to whether regulators have made a criminal referral.189 
Even when a defendant is fully aware of a prosecutor’s interest in a 
civil regulatory matter, agencies can coordinate in ways that thwart the mu-
tuality obligations of the civil discovery process.  For example, both the 
SEC and the CFTC frequently file civil actions concurrently with criminal 
indictments, and the prosecutor will then request a complete or partial stay 
of discovery in the civil proceedings pending resolution of the criminal 
case.190  Defense attorneys will often consent to these stays because they re-
lieve clients of the burden of deciding between responding to a subpoena 
                                                          
 185.  In the words of one former federal prosecutor, in the Southern District of New York 
“[u]sually someone is not a target until the prosecutor is walking to the grand jury with the in-
dictment. Until then they may be a ‘super subject,’ but they’re not a target yet.”  I-6. 
 186.  I-4; see also I-6 (“SDNY attorneys rarely give target letters, because they rarely desig-
nate people as targets until the charges are brought.”). 
 187.  See, e.g., United States v. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (D. Or. 2006), rev’d in part, 
vacated in part, 535 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 188.  I-4. 
 189.  I-6.  This attorney reports that in his experience, and consistent with agency’s formal pol-
icy, SEC staff attorneys “won’t tell the outside world who has got the lead” in a case where crimi-
nal authorities may be working behind the scenes.  I-6.  
 190.  See White, supra note 1 (“When we work together and bring parallel actions, we will 
typically file our actions on the same day, unless there is some investigative reason for one of us 
to act first, such as a need for an emergency asset freeze or to stop a flight risk.”).  Several district 
court judges, most notably Judge Rakoff, have criticized and attempted to push back against this 
practice.  See, e.g., SEC v. Saad, No. 05 Civ. 3308, 229 F.R.D. 90, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Rakoff, 
J.) (describing it as “strange[] . . . that the U.S. Attorney’s Office, having closely coordinated with 
the SEC in bringing simultaneous civil and criminal actions against some hapless defendant, 
should then wish to be relieved of the consequences that will flow if the two actions proceed sim-
ultaneously”).  Cf. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 171 (2d Cir. 2010) (issuing mandamus order 
reversing a stay of discovery where neither party objected to the stay request). 
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and exercising their Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights.191  In prac-
tice, however, these stays can create a startling asymmetry between the in-
formation-gathering capacities of the government and the defendant.  The 
stay of a civil judicial proceeding halts the mutual discovery process that is 
governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.192  However, the stay 
does not prevent an executive agency from using its broad authority to issue 
administrative proceedings in connection with a separate regulatory investi-
gation.193  The SEC, for example, has broad authority to demand evidence 
and compel testimony in connection with a regulatory investigation.194  In 
practice, this permits the agency to serve administrative subpoenas on mat-
ters related to a case that has already been stayed if it purports to have an 
independent regulatory purpose for doing so.195 
It is therefore within the power of many regulatory agencies to thwart 
a defendant’s ability to gather information in a parallel proceeding (by re-
questing a stay of the civil case) while compelling the defendant to continue 
producing information.  The agency can then disclose this information to 
the prosecutor, thereby deepening the information asymmetry that already 
exists between the government and criminal defendants.  According to 
some reports, the SEC has recently begun to exploit this authority to con-
tinue building investigations in cases that have been stayed.196  In these cas-
es, the SEC claimed that it was issuing subpoenas in connection with an un-
                                                          
 191.  Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 97 (2d Cir. 2012) (“A stay 
can protect a civil defendant from facing the difficult choice between being prejudiced in the civil 
litigation, if the defendant asserts his or her Fifth Amendment privilege, or from being prejudiced 
in the criminal litigation if he or she waives that privilege in the civil litigation.”). 
 192.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
 193.  See Bowles v. Bay of N.Y. Coal & Supply Corp., 152 F.2d 330, 331 (2d Cir. 1945).  
 194.  See 15 U.S.C. §78u(b) (2012); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA AUTHORITIES BY 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES AND ENTITIES (2002), 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/rpt_to_congress.htm [hereinafter DOJ, ADMINISTRATIVE 
SUBPOENA REPORT] (describing the full scope of the SEC’s statutory and regulatory authority to 
issue administrative subpoenas); SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 741–42 (1984) (de-
scribing the broad nature of the SEC’s subpoena power). 
 195.  The SEC Enforcement Manual instructs staff not to “use investigative subpoenas solely 
to conduct discovery with respect to claims alleged in the pending complaint.”  SEC, supra note 
60, § 3.1.3 (emphasis added).  But as the SEC has argued, this policy does not bar staff from con-
ducting such discovery when they have an independent reason for using such subpoenas.  See 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Sanctions, Request for Oral Hearing, 
and Brief in Support at 2–3, SEC v. Life Partners Holdings, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00033, 2012 WL 
4854813 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 28 2012) (arguing for reconsideration of a sanctions motion for issuing 
investigative subpoenas in advance of a discovery conference under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)). 
 196.  See Maranda E. Fritz & Eli B. Richlin, A One-Way State: Cautionary Tales from Parallel 
Proceedings, N.Y.L.J. 9, 12 (Apr. 25, 2016), 
http://nylawyer.nylj.com/adgifs/specials/2016_0425_ss_wcc.pdf (discussing the SEC’s conduct in 
United States v. Discala, No. 14-CR-399 (ENV) (E.D.N.Y.), SEC v. Discala, No. 14-CV-4346 
(ENV) (E.D.N.Y.), and in SEC v. Blumberg, No. 2:14-cv-04962 (FSH) (MAH) (D.N.J.)). 
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related matter, but then shared the evidence it obtained with prosecutors 
working on the criminal side of the case that was under a stay order.197  The 
fact that a civil regulatory investigation serves multiple, legitimate purposes 
thus empowers regulators to obtain a significant information advantage in 
parallel proceedings.198 
These systemic risks of parallel enforcement—namely, the potential 
for regulatory distortion and the creation of information asymmetries—are 
not the only considerations that might motivate reforms.  One might be 
concerned, for example, that parallel proceedings unduly pressure defend-
ants to waive their Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights.199  The doc-
trinal hurdles to reforming parallel proceedings, however, should induce 
policymakers to consider how institutional design strategies might achieve 
aims that litigation is unlikely to accomplish.200  In order to develop these 
strategies, one must understand the dynamics that shape the ways in which 
prosecutors and regulators collaborate. 
III. THE MAKE-OR-BUY DECISION IN PARALLEL ENFORCEMENT 
To even the most experienced defense attorneys, regulatory agencies 
and prosecutors’ offices can seem like a monolithic enforcement appa-
ratus.201  In reality, prosecutors and regulators have distinct goals and dif-
ferent sets of incentives.  When these goals and incentives align (and their 
subject matter jurisdictions overlap), prosecutors and regulators may choose 
to coordinate.  Just as importantly, they may choose not to coordinate.202 
This option for choice characteristic distinguishes parallel proceedings 
from traditional, standalone criminal cases.  In ordinary federal criminal 
                                                          
 197.  See id. 
 198.  An attorney familiar with the CFTC’s enforcement practices took pains to stress that the 
agency does not engage in such practices, and expressed skepticism that the SEC would do so.  I-
8. 
 199.  See infra notes 274–278 and accompanying text. 
 200.  Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons 
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 907 (2009) (arguing for institutional reforms to 
address prosecutorial abuses in light of judicial reluctance to interfere with the internal operations 
of prosecutors’ offices). 
 201.  For example, as stated by one elite white-collar defense attorney—one of the few of his 
caliber without prosecutorial experience—“the Southern District of New York and the SEC are in 
lockstep.”  I-10. 
 202.  See Robert K. Huffman et al., The Perils of Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings: A 
Primer, 10 HEALTH L. 1, 4 (1998).  Huffman et al. write, 
Many U.S. Attorney’s offices have coordination policies, and if the criminal and civil 
attorneys are from the same U.S. Attorney’s office, their coordination will be governed 
by whatever local policy on parallel proceedings is in place.  If, however, the attorneys 
are from different parts of the DOJ, the degree of cooperation lies largely within the in-
dividual attorneys’ discretion. 
Id. 
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cases, prosecutors and investigators are mutually dependent on each other 
to secure convictions.203  As Daniel Richman influentially observed, the re-
lationship between these actors is a “bilateral monopoly” wherein prosecu-
tors control access to federal court and agents control most of the investiga-
tive resources.204  Often, a U.S. Attorney’s Office will have complete 
control over whether to prosecute a case that law enforcement agents have 
invested in building.  Conversely, agents often have considerable control 
over the cases that they wish to build and the tactics they use to build 
them.205  Thus, for standalone criminal cases, federal prosecutors and inves-
tigative agents are bilaterally dependent.206 
In parallel proceedings—or, rather, in matters that could potentially 
become parallel proceedings—this bilateral dependence does not exist.  
This simple, constitutive feature of parallel proceedings has significant 
structural implications with respect to the inter-agency dynamics that shape 
criminal and civil enforcement.  Specifically, the choices facing criminal 
and civil regulators in the parallel enforcement context can be helpfully 
characterized as a set of “make-or-buy” decisions analogous to those that 
shape the contractual relationships between private firms.207  Both civil and 
criminal regulators can choose to use their in-house resources to achieve 
their desired enforcement outcomes, or they can “buy” these resources from 
their civil or criminal counterpart at the cost of lending their resources and 
expertise to that agency.  Over time, civil and criminal agencies can choose 
                                                          
 203.  Richman, supra note 28, at 758. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  See id. at 767–69.  As Richman acknowledges, this characterization of the prosecutor-
agent relationship is somewhat broad.  In some instances, FBI agents have the ability to choose 
between different U.S. Attorney’s Offices that each have venue over a case.  See id. at 759–60.  In 
others, the agents can pitch their case to state or local prosecutors rather than to the U.S. Attor-
ney’s Office (or bring the case to state or local prosecutors after a federal prosecutor has declined 
to prosecute).  See id. at 760–61.  
 206.  See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 16 (1999) (summariz-
ing the transaction cost economic theory of bilateral dependence). 
 207.  See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388, 393–94 (1937).  
Economists have elaborated upon the “make-or-buy” model to analyze governments’ choices of 
whether to provide a service or contract with private firms to do so.  See, e.g., Oliver Hart et al., 
The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons, 112 Q. J. ECON. 1127 
(1997); Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evi-
dence from U.S. Cities, 58 J. INDUS. ECON. 507 (2010); Oliver E. Williamson, Public & Private 
Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Perspective, 15 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 306, 319 (1999).   
Recently, economists Jonathan Levin and Steven Tadelis have examined the conditions un-
der which American cities will contract with non-municipal public agencies to provide a govern-
ment service.  See Levin & Tadelis, supra note 207, at 526–35.  Levin and Tadelis found that, in 
this context, public sector contracting is a substitute for the in-house provision of a government 
service (“making”) rather than for private contracting (“buying”).  Id. at 535.  The research data 
underlying my article suggests that the “make-or-buy” literature nevertheless provides a useful 
framework for understanding the incentives of prosecutors and regulators in the parallel enforce-
ment context. 
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the institutional arrangements for achieving their enforcement goals that re-
sult in the lowest transaction costs.  The make-or-buy decisions in parallel 
proceedings thus inform both the case-by-case decisionmaking and the 
broader policy choices of both prosecutors and civil enforcers.  This Part 
presents and develops this make-or-buy framework based on current and 
former prosecutors’ and regulators’ accounts of their decisionmaking strat-
egies in parallel proceedings. 
A.  The Make-or-Buy Decision Structure 
In pursuit of their respective goals of high-profile convictions and 
high-profile civil judgments and settlements, prosecutors and regulators will 
be responsive to transaction (or maladaptation) costs.208  Parallel proceed-
ings give both prosecutors and regulators a greater range of options for re-
ducing transaction costs than those available in ordinary criminal cases.  In 
ordinary criminal cases, prosecutors and investigators are bilaterally de-
pendent to the degree that requires them to defer to each other’s goals.  In 
parallel proceedings, however, prosecutors and regulators face a set of 
“make-or-buy” decisions that are not present in traditional criminal cases.209  
This feature of parallel proceedings is essential to understand their opera-
tion. 
“Transaction costs” are notoriously difficult to define.210  It suffices for 
the purposes of this Article, however, to treat them as the bargaining costs 
that arise when parties are bilaterally dependent.  In the private sector, bilat-
eral dependence often occurs because one actor makes asset-specific in-
vestments related to the product that it is exchanging with the other.211  In 
                                                          
 208.  There is a substantial body of literature applying transaction cost economics to the deci-
sions of agencies to contract with private firms.  See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Gov-
ernment Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389, 390 (2003).  Other scholars have applied this approach to 
Congress’s decision whether to delegate authority to agencies.  See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & 
SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO 
POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999); Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the 
Credibility of Agency Commitments, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1049 (2007); Matthew C. Stephen-
son, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agen-
cies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1049–57 (2006).  Scholars have further analogized 
government decisions of whether to privatize a service to the “make” or “buy” decisions of private 
firms.  See, e.g., Levin & Tadelis, supra note 207.  This Article appears to be among the first, 
however, to apply the analogy to inter-agency decisionmaking. 
 209.  See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388, 393–94 (1937). 
 210.  See Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1483–
90 (2013). 
 211.  See Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Dis-
crete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269, 281–82 (1991).  Williamson defines asset 
specific investments as “durable investments that are undertaken in support of particular transac-
tions, the opportunity cost of which investments is much lower in best alternative uses or by alter-
native users should the original transaction be prematurely terminated.”  OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, 
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 55 (1985). 
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the short term, these investments create transaction costs that deepen the ac-
tors’ bilateral dependence.  If these actors are unable to reach mutually sat-
isfactory contractual arrangements when operating under such conditions, 
then their continuing relationship will generate even greater transaction 
costs.212  But in the long run, if these costs continue to rise, it will be effi-
cient for the firms to undertake the expense of vertically integrating.213 
In ordinary criminal cases—those not involving parallel proceedings—
the bilateral dependence of prosecutors and their investigating agents exists 
to an even greater degree than is common in a private market.  As a matter 
of statutory design, however, federal prosecutors and federal agents are un-
able to respond to maladaptive costs by vertically integrating.  In a tradi-
tional (non-parallel) case, a federal prosecutor cannot simply decline the 
services of an FBI agent and independently build her own investigations.214  
Likewise, an FBI agent cannot ignore a federal prosecutor’s declination de-
cision and file a criminal case on her own. 
In cases involving parallel proceedings, however, agencies can rede-
ploy their resources in response to the quality of their relationships with 
other regulators.  This enables each agency to decide whether to “make” or 
“buy” the resources required to achieve their respective enforcement goals.  
To reduce litigation costs, civil regulators may cooperate with prosecutors 
so that they can use a criminal conviction to invoke collateral estoppel and 
thus bar a defendant from challenging her civil liability.  To reduce investi-
gation costs, a regulator may reach out to a prosecutor or an FBI agent to 
determine whether they have access to witness interviews, wiretaps,215 or 
other information that prosecutors gathered by investigating “outside” the 
grand jury.216  At the same time, this cooperation with prosecutors may in-
crease the payoff to regulators by increasing the settlement value of a case.  
If the costs of cooperating with prosecutors are too high, however, then 
regulators can invest in the expertise and resources necessary to investigate 
and litigate their cases in-house.  They can, in other words, “make” the liti-
gation and investigation goods that they would otherwise have “bought” 
from prosecutors. 
                                                          
 212.  See id. at 106–08.  Please note that Williamson post-1991 favors the term “maladaptation 
costs.”  See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 206, at 107. 
 213.  See WILLIAMSON, supra note 206, at 16 (“[A]lthough the unified ownership of both stag-
es incurs bureaucratic costs of its own, hierarchy (vertical integration) becomes the cost-effective 
governance structure as asset specificity progressively deepens.”). 
 214.  See Richman, supra note 28, at 767. 
 215.  Although the regulator may not be able to obtain the wiretap evidence directly from pros-
ecutors, they may be able to gather the information from defendants through civil discovery.  See 
SEC. v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 180–82 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 216.  See infra notes 281–288 and accompanying text. 
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Criminal prosecutors, likewise, may decide between “buying” infor-
mation and litigation goods from regulators or “making” them in-house.  To 
reduce investigation costs, prosecutors may reach out to an agency with an 
impressive informational network and try to build a criminal case based on 
some of the promising tips, complaints, and referrals (“TCRs”) that come 
into the agency’s office.  Beyond the information that an agency passively 
receives from TCRs, it might have its own civil investigators seeking out 
cases that a U.S. Attorney might find promising.217  To reduce litigation 
costs, prosecutors may rely on the substantive expertise of an agency’s staff 
in order to establish a defendant’s liability, and may even use agency staff 
as expert witnesses in appropriate cases.218  Alternatively, the prosecutor 
could purchase these resources from a competing regulator, or “make” them 
internally. 
Over time, agencies can choose the institutional structures for achiev-
ing their enforcement goals that result in the lowest transaction costs.219  For 
example, if a civil regulator repeatedly compromises a criminal investiga-
tion by failing to disclose (or, as I will explain below, “creating”) Brady 
material, a prosecutor will weigh this cost against those of developing rela-
tionships with new investigatory agents.  Conversely, civil regulators will 
consider the costs of cooperating with a federal prosecutor who repeatedly 
manipulates a civil investigation for their own purposes, or files indictments 
in a manner that deprives the civil regulator of credit for their work.  When 
one agency redeploys its assets away from cooperating with another, the 
other agency will respond by redeploying its assets as necessary. 
This set of dynamics can shape institutional norms in profound ways.  
For example, inter-agency trust plays a substantial and systemic role in the 
decisions governing parallel proceedings.220  For the purposes of analyzing 
organizational relationships, “trust” can be usefully defined as: 
[A] particular level of the subjective probability with which an 
agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform 
a particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or in-
                                                          
 217.  The SEC’s Office of Market Intelligence, for example, actively engages in market sur-
veillance using a “‘market watch room,’ replete with Bloomberg terminals and real-time stock 
pricing monitors that keep an eye on the markets.”  Ben Protess & Azam Ahmed, With New Fire-
power, S.E.C. Tracks Bigger Game, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2012), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/21/with-new-firepower-s-e-c-tracks-bigger-game/?_r=1 
(quoting Thomas A. Sparkin). 
 218.  I-8. 
 219.  See WILLIAMSON, supra note 206, at 5. 
 220.  For a summary of academic literature on interpersonal trust that is potentially relevant to 
legal scholarship, see Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1717, 1718 & nn.1–7 (2006). 
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dependently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a 
context in which it affects his own action.221 
So defined, questions of interpersonal trust are relevant to every set of 
human interactions,222 including the administration of criminal law.223  In 
every criminal case, prosecutors and agents must trust one another to col-
laborate productively.224  In the parallel enforcement context, trust can have 
significant operational consequences.  This is because the organizational 
significance of trust correlates with the power to exit.  The greater an ac-
tor’s freedom to terminate a working relationship, the greater role trust 
plays in governing their decisions within the relationship.225  In the tradi-
tional prosecutor-agent dynamic, civil enforcers and criminal prosecutors 
often lack the option to exit their working relationships with one another.  
When these relationships break down, the actors will go to great cost to im-
prove them.  For example, they may compromise their institutional priori-
ties and invest resources to improve the competence of their collabora-
tors.226 
But parallel proceedings are different.  When the working relationships 
between civil and criminal regulators erode, they can stop collaborating 
without shutting down for business.  This dynamic is exacerbated by the in-
formal nature of inter-agency cooperation in parallel proceedings.  In order 
for such informality to work, the institutions must invest in maintaining 
high degrees of trust.227  These investments can serve as constraints on 
                                                          
 221.  See Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust?, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE 
RELATIONS 213, 217 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988). 
 222.  See id. at 219. 
 223.  For a fascinating examination of the relevance of trust to the administration of criminal 
enterprises, see DIEGO GAMBETTA, CODES OF THE UNDERWORLD: HOW CRIMINALS 
COMMUNICATE (2011). 
 224.  Cf. Richman, supra note 28, at 830 (proposing oversight over the length of time prosecu-
tors and agents work together in order to better “develop the specialized knowledge and agent 
trust that would facilitate productive exchanges”). 
 225.  See Gambetta, supra note 221, at 218–29. 
 226.  See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO 
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
 227.  See Walter W. Powell, Trust-Based Forms of Governance, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: 
FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 59–60 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996) 
(arguing that in strategic alliances where trust is not easily established, actors must “rely on con-
tractual agreements to curb potential opportunism” and “formally structured” monitoring); cf. 
Ronald J. Gilson, et al., Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 
CORNELL L. REV. 23, 67 (2014) (“[A]s uncertainty becomes fully Knightian, and state-contingent 
contracting becomes close to impossible rather than merely gap-ridden, . . . the parties’ formal 
contractual arrangement then focuses on specifying a collaborative process, the goal of which is to 
create the context that will support the informal mechanisms of trust that will regulate the actual 
provision of goods and services.”).  For a thorough survey of the “social norms” literature to 
which these observations contribute, see Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of 
Tacit Understandings, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 604–07 (2007). 
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agencies’ behavior by ensuring that one agency does not deviate too far 
from the policy goals of the other. 
Under some conditions, however, one agency may be so dependent on 
the other that trust becomes less relevant.  When this situation occurs—a 
situation in which an agency is trapped in a cooperative relationship with 
high holdup costs—exploitation and capture of the dependent agency’s 
agenda becomes possible.  For example, if a regional office of the SEC 
lacks the ability to effectively litigate cases at trial, it may have to rely on a 
local U.S. Attorney’s Office to secure the convictions it needs to obtain 
quick settlements.228  Under such circumstances, the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
has the power to use the SEC’s investigation as a tool for generating charg-
es against a defendant (by eliciting false statements in the course of a depo-
sition) and establishing venue (by scheduling depositions within the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office’s jurisdiction).  In other words, when the SEC’s litigation 
skills are weak, the U.S. Attorney can behave as it did in United States v. 
Scrushy.229  In the short run, while the civil regulator remains dependent, 
the prosecutor need not worry about the erosion of trust that this behavior 
creates.  In the long run, however, the civil regulator can respond to these 
conditions by investing in the litigation skills necessary to sever its relation-
ship with the prosecutor. 
Of course, there are significant limits to a transaction-cost analysis of 
the decisionmaking in parallel proceedings.  Political considerations and 
cultural norms may keep regulators coordinating with each other long after 
doing so has ceased to be productive.230  When change does occur, it will 
often result from exogenous pressures rather than from shifts in the rela-
tionship with a regulator.231  Or the motivations of regulators may be so var-
ied and inscrutable that the governance of parallel proceedings is driven by 
ambitious bureaucrats seeking out problems on which to impose their idio-
syncratically preferred solutions.232  The realities of parallel proceedings, 
however, suggest that a transaction cost analysis has considerable explana-
tory value. 
                                                          
 228.  See David M. Becker, What More Can Be Done to Deter Violations of the Federal Secu-
rities Laws?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1858 n.75 (2012) (citing news reports following the 2008 fi-
nancial crash where “the public perceived an SEC afraid to litigate, that settled cases for relief far 
milder than what could be obtained at trial”).  
 229.  See supra notes 88–100 and accompanying text; see also I-5. 
 230.  Cf. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 240–41 (1979) (“Other things being equal, idiosyncratic ex-
change relations which feature personal trust will survive greater stress and display greater adapt-
ability.”). 
 231.  See, e.g., infra notes 394–405 and accompanying text (describing reforms to the SEC’s 
Enforcement Division in response to the Madoff scandal). 
 232.  See generally Michael D. Cohen et al., A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 
17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 (1972).  
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B.  Collaborative Options in Parallel Proceedings 
Unlike simple make-or-buy decisions, the more complex ones that 
prosecutors and civil enforcers face do not involve simply a binary choice 
for each party to either build its in-house litigation and investigation re-
sources or “buy” them from another party.  When it is desirable to cooper-
ate with an outside agency in the service of these goals, both criminal and 
civil regulators have a range of options available to them.  Both federal and 
civil enforcers take advantage of their exit power to adjust their agency alli-
ances in parallel proceedings to advance their enforcement priorities.  In 
terms of their options for “buying” goods through parallel proceedings, 
however, agencies differ in their bargaining power. 
In choosing whether to collaborate with a criminal prosecutor, flexible 
venue rules help to ensure that regulators have options when selecting their 
prosecutor.233  For example, the venue rules for white-collar offenses—
especially for securities offenses—are notoriously expansive.234  These 
rules enable regulators to cooperate with the U.S. Attorney’s Office of their 
choice and to reject the overtures of a disfavored office.  In addition, the 
regulator can bring their case to the relevant specialty unit in Main Jus-
tice.235  As one former SEC officer explained, for matters that prosecutors 
discover independently, the case is usually brought in the jurisdiction where 
venue most naturally lies.236  If the SEC learns about an issue before prose-
cutors do, however, the agency will make an independent decision whether 
to refer the case and to which criminal authority.237  On these matters, there 
are some subject areas that naturally fall within the province of a specific 
                                                          
 233.  See, e.g., Yin Wilczek, Interaction of SEC’s Bounty Program, Cooperation Initiative 
Remains to Be Seen, White Collar Crime Report (BNA) (June 17, 2011) (reporting that the Deputy 
Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division, “in response to a question as to where the SEC refers 
its matters, said the commission constantly is reminded by [the] U.S. Attorney for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia . . . and [the] U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York . . . that their 
districts have broad jurisdiction over SEC cases.  The SEC makes the decision based on its ‘best 
judgment,’ he said.”). 
 234.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2012) (general venue provision providing that an offense may 
be “prosecuted in any district in which” it was “begun, continued, or completed”); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (2012) (providing that securities offenses may be 
prosecuted in any district “wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business” 
or where “any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred”); Daniel C. Richman, Federal 
Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 
782 (1999) (noting that “the flexibility of federal venue requirements often expose potential tar-
gets (particularly in the white-collar area) to prosecution in several different districts”). 
 235.  See, e.g., Thad A. Davis, A New Model of Securities Law Enforcement, 32 CUMB. L. 
REV. 69, 81–82 (2002) (“Currently, when the SEC perceives a possible criminal violation of the 
securities laws it may, in its discretion, refer such action to the main Justice Department, or alter-
natively, directly to a United States Attorney’s Office.”). 
 236.  Interview with anonymous source 12 [hereinafter I-12]. 
 237.  Id. 
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U.S. Attorney’s Office or Main Justice.238  For example, Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (“FCPA”) claims naturally fall within the purview of the 
Fraud Section of Main Justice.239  Even these cases, however, permit the 
SEC some discretion to choose among different prosecutors.240 
Civil regulatory agencies will often differ in their bargaining power 
with respect to selecting prosecutors.  The CFTC, for example, has a range 
of options for cooperating with prosecutors.  The agency must be careful, 
however, to choose its prosecutors wisely to ensure that they will actually 
be able to reap the benefits of a criminal referral.241  In choosing a prosecu-
tor, the dominant factor that shapes the CFTC’s referral decisions is which 
prosecutor’s office is likely to “run with a case.”242  One potential source of 
frustration with parallel proceedings, according to an attorney familiar with 
the CFTC, is the possibility that criminal authorities will accept a referral 
but not follow through on the investigation.243  CFTC officials therefore do 
their best to coordinate with criminal authorities in advance of a referral to 
make sure that the office has the time and commitment to pursue the 
case.244 
When making criminal referrals, CFTC attorneys evaluate a number of 
“commonsense” considerations that include whether an office has the ca-
pacity and will to prioritize the case.245 In terms of competition between 
these offices for high-profile cases, a U.S. Attorney will often make clear 
that she is interested in pursuing the case.246  As one former CFTC attorney 
conceded, however, U.S. Attorneys are not always as “gung ho” about pur-
suing the agency’s cases as they are about cases on the SEC’s docket.247  
The Fraud Section of Main Justice, by contrast, has a large staff devoted to 
prosecuting the sort of cases that the CFTC generates.248  A relatively easy 
“retail fraud” case may go to a U.S. Attorney’s Office that has an interest in 
taking it even if its value is too small for an office such as the SDNY to pri-
                                                          
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  For example, one former SEC officer reported that for certain matters there is a prefer-
ence for the Southern District of New York, but not monolithically so.  Id. 
 241.  As to their options, the CFTC may refer a criminal case to a U.S. Attorney’s Office, the 
Fraud Section of Main Justice, an FBI field office, or a state or county prosecutor.  I-8; I-7. 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  For example, the complexity of a case will often determine the office to which it is re-
ferred.  If a case involves a complex matter that requires considerable financial expertise, it will 
typically go to the SDNY, the Eastern District of New York (“EDNY”), the DOJ Fraud Section, or 
the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago).  I-8; I-7. 
 246.  I-8. 
 247.  I-7. 
 248.  Id. 
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oritize.  Smaller cases may also go to state or local criminal enforcement 
authorities, including the Manhattan District Attorney.249  In addition, the 
CFTC frequently works with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in Florida (which of-
ten prosecute fraud cases involving defendants who take advantage of retir-
ees), the Western District of North Carolina, and the Central District of Cal-
ifornia.250  This range of options, according to one attorney familiar with the 
CFTC’s enforcement practices, ensures that there will rarely be a case in-
volving potential criminal conduct that does not get referred to some crimi-
nal office.251 
By contrast, the SEC appears to have more buying power when it 
comes to choosing a prosecutor.  The SEC’s Enforcement Division devotes 
more time to selecting among prosecutors who want their cases than selling 
their cases to prosecutors.  As with the CFTC, the broad venue provisions 
of federal securities laws permit the SEC to choose among a range of U.S. 
Attorneys as well as the Fraud Section of Main Justice.  The SEC will also 
coordinate with the Manhattan District Attorney on certain cases—as it has 
recently done concerning a small value but high-profile investigation con-
cerning former New Jersey Governor Chris Christie and the Port Authori-
ty252—but appears rarely to do so. 
For high-profile SEC cases, there appears to be strong competition 
among different federal prosecutors.  Several former SEC attorneys report-
ed that U.S. Attorneys and Main Justice Leadership would regularly visit 
the agency’s headquarters to maintain relationships with senior officers and 
“prospect” for high-profile cases.253  As one former officer explained, pros-
ecutors from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New 
York would occasionally come to SEC Headquarters to maintain relation-
ships with the Enforcement Division.  Prosecutors from other U.S. Attor-
neys’ offices—including the Eastern District of Virginia—have also done 
this to varying degrees.254 
In terms of the pecking order for these high-profile cases, the Southern 
District of New York appears to be first among equals.  The office is re-
nowned for its expertise in securities fraud (although sometimes criticized 
for its failure to aggressively prosecute those involved in the financial cri-
                                                          
 249.  I-8. 
 250.  I-7. 
 251.  I-8. 
 252.  See Press Release, SEC, Port Authority Omitted Risks to Investors in Roadway Projects 
(Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017-4.html; Matt Flegenheimer et al., 
2nd Bridge Inquiry Said to Be Linked to Christie, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/nyregion/2nd-bridge-inquiry-said-to-be-linked-to-
christie.html. 
 253.  I-2; I-5; I-9. 
 254.  I-12. 
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sis).255  There is substantial overlap between the dockets of SDNY prosecu-
tors and SEC trial attorneys, particularly those in the SEC’s New York Re-
gional Office.256  According to one former SDNY prosecutor, during his 
time in the office “[m]ore than half of the securities fraud cases” that were 
handled by the Securities and Commodities Fraud Task Force “also ha[d] 
an SEC component.”257  This degree of collaboration both reinforces and 
reflects what another former SDNY prosecutor described as a “special rela-
tionship” between this office and the SEC.258  For example, according to 
both former SDNY prosecutors and SEC regulators, it was common for 
SDNY prosecutors below the U.S. Attorney level—including the Chief of 
the Criminal Division and the head of the Securities & Commodities Fraud 
Task Force—to regularly visit the SEC Headquarters in Washington, D.C. 
to maintain relationships with senior officers at the SEC and to prospect for 
cases.259 
For SEC cases that were not of the highest profile, a former senior of-
ficer at the SEC described the referral process as being more decentral-
ized.260  The regional offices of the SEC tended to develop strong collabora-
tive relationships with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices that were adept at pursuing 
securities fraud cases.  With respect to cases that are referred at this level, a 
former senior officer at the SEC indicated that he was surprised by the in-
formality of the referral process.  For example, SEC staff attorneys might 
decide to initiate the criminal referral process if they decided that a target 
met the requisite level of criminal intent.  In such cases, a staff attorney at 
the SEC might call an Assistant U.S. Attorney with whom she has a rela-
tionship to let her know of an interesting case, and a formal access request 
from the U.S. Attorney’s Office would follow.  This former senior officer at 
the SEC also described an informal monthly meeting where the local U.S. 
Attorney would ask, “[W]hat are you working on?”  This attorney recalled 
that, at times, federal prosecutors might be so eager to pursue a case that 
SEC staff attorneys had to exercise some discretion to prevent a hasty refer-
ral.261 
                                                          
 255.  See, e.g., Max Minzner, Should Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2113, 2115 n.6 
(2015) (noting that “the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York has 
a particular expertise in securities cases”). 
 256.  There is little public data on this overlap, but one former prosecutor estimated that, dur-
ing his time at the SDNY, more than half of the securities fraud cases “had an SEC component.”  
I-6. 
 257.  Id. 
 258.  I-1. 
 259.  I-1; I-5; I-9. 
 260.  I-2. 
 261.  Id. 
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These reports suggest that the make-or-buy dynamic differs between 
agencies.  Some prosecutors—such as those in the Southern District of New 
York—have considerable buying power, while others might have to settle 
for collaborating on lower profile cases.  Likewise, some agencies—such as 
the SEC—have impressive selling power.  Others agencies will have less 
selling power, and might therefore have to be strategic in choosing prosecu-
tors who will agree to work a case. 
Of course, if the costs of collaborating on a parallel proceeding be-
come too high, both civil and criminal regulators can both decide to forego 
cooperation and “make” their cases using the resources available to them 
in-house.  If the civil enforcer with independent litigating authority does not 
wish to cooperate with a prosecutor, it retains the option of pursuing its own 
civil case.  Therefore, civil regulators may simply decline to refer a case to 
criminal prosecutors and use the non-criminal remedies and investigative 
resources available to them in order to sanction a defendant.  This choice 
allows for a range of enforcement options.  First, the regulator could pursue 
its case in federal court and can take advantage of broad venue rules to file 
the case in the jurisdiction it deems appropriate.262  Second, the agency 
could choose to avoid federal court and pursue its case through administra-
tive proceedings.263  Thus, an agency’s enforcement priorities are not only 
protected from the threat of prosecutorial declination, but also from the 
threat of unfavorable treatment in federal court. 
Similarly, a U.S. Attorney’s Office may simply decline to coordinate 
with a regulatory agency and build its investigation using resources within 
the Justice Department.  This option may be attractive in cases that require 
relatively few investigative resources, either due to their simplicity or be-
cause they involve a sophisticated corporate defendant that is eagerly pre-
senting the government with evidence it has obtained through its own inter-
nal investigation.  Even if a case requires extensive investigation, however, 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office can choose between competing federal investiga-
tive agencies with overlapping degrees of expertise in the relevant matter.  
In a financial crimes case, for example, the prosecutor might be able to lev-
erage the expertise of the FBI or the Secret Service.264  Accordingly, as one 
                                                          
 262.  Given the institutional design of many regulatory agencies, however, this will not neces-
sarily result in the level of forum shopping that would otherwise be possible.  For example, the 
New York Regional Office of the SEC has jurisdiction in New York and New Jersey.  See New 
York Regional Office, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/page/sec-new-york-regional-office (last visited 
Apr. 30, 2018). 
 263.  David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1157 (2016). 
 264.  Although the Secret Service is part of the Department of Homeland Security, it does not 
have independent litigating authority and must therefore rely on the DOJ’s prosecutorial gatekeep-
ing power.  See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of 
litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and 
securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction 
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U.S. Attorney has observed, prosecutors do not have to “put all their inves-
tigative eggs in one basket” and can choose between investigators based on 
their level of resources and their degree of commitment to the case.265   
1.  Benefits and Costs to Civil Regulators 
For civil regulators, the potential benefits from collaborating with 
prosecutors include both an expansion in the remedies available to them 
and, to a lesser extent, an informational advantage.266  First, parallel pro-
ceedings permit civil and criminal regulators to essentially merge the set of 
civil and criminal remedies that are available to each regulator respectively.  
By expanding the range of remedies that they can collectively obtain 
against a defendant, both civil and criminal regulators can increase the pay-
off of their enforcement actions while reducing their costs. 
This expansion of available remedies is particularly attractive to civil 
regulators.  To state the obvious, criminal convictions can result in stigma, 
collateral consequences, and—significantly—prison time.267  As current 
                                                          
of the Attorney General.”); see also, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 726 F.3d 208, 
210 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (listing DOJ attorneys as counsel for appellants). 
 265.  See Richman, supra note 28, at 770 (reporting on the statements of the U.S. Attorney for 
the Western District of North Carolina concerning the jurisdictional overlaps between the FBI and 
the Secret Service on white-collar cases). 
 266.  This analysis assumes that there is alignment of the incentives and goals that motivate 
civil investigators and litigating enforcement attorneys.  In the criminal context, federal investiga-
tive agents (including those within the DOJ) do not report to federal prosecutors.  See U. S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZATION, MISSION, AND FUNCTIONS MANUAL: DOJ ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHART, https://www.justice.gov/agencies/chart (last visited Apr. 30, 2018).  This creates the po-
tential for agenda conflicts that must be carefully negotiated between prosecutors and investiga-
tors.  See generally Richman, supra note 28.  In most regulatory agencies, by contrast, civil inves-
tigators and prosecutors are one and the same.  In the SEC, for example, the power to issue 
subpoenas is delegated to the Enforcement Director, who in turn delegates the authority to mid-
level enforcement officers.  See James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce 
the Securities Laws, 100 CAL. L. REV. 115, 146 n.127 (2012); MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. 
FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT, 25A, § 9:1 nn.3–5 (up-
dated Sept. 2015).  Within this structure, the SEC has traditionally separated the Enforcement Di-
vision’s trial attorneys and investigating attorneys.  See Terence J. Lynam, Going to Trial Against 
the SEC, BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP., Sept. 2007, at 6.  In recent years, however, the En-
forcement Division has reportedly reorganized this structure “by pairing groups of trial attorneys 
with groups of investigative lawyers so that trial staff are involved earlier in the investigations, 
and vice versa.”  Ed Beeson, SEC Silences Critics with Resounding Victory in Wyly Trial, 
LAW360 (May 14, 2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/537677/sec-silences-critics-with-
resounding-victory-in-wyly-trial.  This organizational structure would seem to reduce the incen-
tive misalignments and power struggles that create tension between criminal prosecutors and 
agents. 
 267.  For the type of white-collar cases that are frequently pursued in parallel, the criminal 
penalties are particularly serious.  See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Punishments for Insider Trading Are 
Growing Stiffer, N.Y. TIMES: WHITE COLLAR WATCH (Sept. 9, 2014, 10:44 AM), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/punishments-for-insider-trading-are-growing-
stiffer/?_r=0. 
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SEC Chair (and former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York) has said, “There are, of course, no more powerful tools than a crimi-
nal conviction and the prospect—and reality—of imprisonment.”268  In ad-
dition, criminal prosecution can increase the monetary sums that the gov-
ernment would otherwise be unable to recover.269  The criminal forfeiture 
statute can sometimes enable the government to recover assets that would 
otherwise be beyond the reach of the civil regulator.270  Moreover, a convic-
tion can result in criminal penalties beyond those imposed by a civil settle-
ment.271 
Convictions also increase the settlement value of a case.272  As Wil-
liam Stuntz observed, “[T]he stakes in criminal litigation have two critically 
important characteristics: They are both extremely large and nonmone-
tary. . . .  If a given defendant has a million dollars in the bank, he might 
well find it worthwhile to spend it all to achieve a successful out-
come . . . .”273  In the parallel enforcement context, one such outcome would 
be a coordinated non-prosecution agreement that involves the payment of 
heavy civil penalties.  By revealing that prosecutors are interested in a civil 
enforcement case, a civil regulatory agency will motivate a defendant to pay 
a steep price for such an agreement. 
In addition to raising settlement value, however, there are two ways in 
which a criminal conviction will substantially reduce the costs of litigating 
the settlement.  First, if the government is able to obtain a conviction, the 
regulator can invoke collateral estoppel to bar the defendant from litigating 
                                                          
 268.  White, supra note 1. 
 269.  For example, the SEC’s Fair Fund provision gives it the authority to compensate inves-
tors for their losses using civil penalties and the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.  See Verity Win-
ship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103, 1110 
(2008).  The agency cannot, however, predicate a civil penalty on the full amount of shareholders’ 
losses.  See SEC Directors Testify at Senate Hearings on Structural Reforms, SEC Today 
12891582 (summarizing testimony of SEC Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami); see also Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 21(d), 21A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), 78u-1 (2012) (setting forth the 
remedies available to the SEC). 
 270.  See 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (2012). 
 271.  See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Petrochemical Manufacturer Braskem S.A. to Pay $957 
Million to Settle FCPA Charges (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-
271.html (reporting that a petrochemical manufacturer charged with FCPA violations “agreed to 
pay $325 million in disgorgement, including $65 million to the SEC” and “more than $632 mil-
lion in criminal penalties and fines”). 
 272.  Cf. Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 886 (2007) 
(“The DOJ’s added value may be that in unusually serious [parallel enforcement] cases, it can se-
cure cooperation using the deterrent threat of indictment.”).  
 273.  William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal 
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 31 (1997) (analyzing criminal defendants’ willingness to pay for legal 
representation). 
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her liability with respect to those issues.274  Thus, the mere credible threat of 
a conviction will incentivize a defendant to spare regulators the costs of 
challenging important aspects of their case.  By cooperating in this manner, 
the defendant may hope to avoid a criminal charge while avoiding the costs 
of litigating an issue that she would have to forfeit anyway. 
Second, the threat of a conviction might incentivize a defendant to ac-
cept adverse inferences against her—and thus reduce the government’s liti-
gation costs—in order to avoid incriminating herself.  Because the Fifth 
Amendment’s self-incrimination right275 extends only to criminal cases, tri-
ers of fact may draw adverse inferences in a civil proceeding if a defendant 
chooses to remain silent.276  Thus, by helping prosecutors build a criminal 
conviction, civil regulators can substantially increase the settlement value of 
a case against a defendant who is willing to take an adverse inference in the 
civil proceeding to reduce the risk of prison time.277  One white-collar de-
fense attorney (and former SDNY prosecutor) explained that sometimes 
people overstate the degree to which this is a problem because “you can 
cure adverse inferences anytime before trial.”278  Other defense attorneys, 
however, suggest that the doctrine governing when an adverse inference can 
be cured is so underdeveloped that lawyers cannot factor it in to the advice 
they offer clients.279 
Accordingly, the selection of remedies—in the form of criminal con-
victions, civil settlements, criminal and civil forfeiture orders, non-
prosecution agreements, and other resolutions of parallel proceedings—is 
central to the collaborative process between civil and criminal regulators.  
Many deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements in 
white-collar cases bear the hallmarks of close collaboration between federal 
                                                          
 274.  See Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that “federal 
law . . . accept[s] the general principle that a criminal conviction has collateral estoppel effect in a 
civil action”). 
 275.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 276.  See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 97 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“[T]he greatest risk posed by parallel [civil and criminal proceedings] . . . is that parallel proceed-
ings may place significant burdens upon the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Alvin Hellerstein & Gary 
Naftalis, Private Civil Actions and Concurrent or Subsequent Regulatory or Criminal Proceed-
ings, SG046 ALI–ABA 903, 905 (2001))).  
 277.  See MARVIN G. PICKHOLZ, PETER J. HENNING & JASON R. PICKHOLZ, 21 SEC. CRIMES 
Protective Orders § 4:5, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2017) (“To allow civil discovery to 
proceed, or to proceed without any Rule 26(c) protective order, sets the stage for the defendant 
trapped in parallel proceedings to be victimized by creating an in terrorem increment in the set-
tlement values of a case because, even if later allowed to testify, a defendant who invokes the 
Fifth Amendment during discovery faces the use of his earlier invocation as an impeachment de-
vice.” (footnote omitted)). 
 278.  I-4.  
 279.  I-11. 
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prosecutors and civil regulators.280  Indeed, the DOJ’s policy statement 
governing parallel proceedings—the Holder Memo—instructs agency at-
torneys to assess the impact of a guilty plea on the resolution of a civil 
case.281  In making these assessments, DOJ attorneys are advised to engage 
in “[e]ffective and timely communication[s]” with the staff of other agen-
cies “so that agencies can pursue available remedies at an appropriate 
time.”282  It is therefore standard practice for experienced defense attorneys 
to seek “coordinated settlements” with criminal and civil regulators in par-
allel proceedings.283 
The informational benefits to regulators from coordination are subtler.  
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure bar prosecutors from disclosing 
matters before a grand jury except in certain enumerated circumstances.284  
However, to facilitate collaboration with civil regulators, prosecutors can 
work “outside” the grand jury.285  As one former prosecutor explained, “[I]t 
is not that difficult to investigate with means other than the grand jury in 
parallel proceeding contexts.  Eventually you may want to use the grand ju-
ry to memorialize a witness’s testimony, but you can also lock down a wit-
ness’s statements by taking precise notes of an interview.”286  For example, 
the FBI may conduct a “knock and talk” interview of any person who may 
be relevant to a criminal investigation.287  Several experienced defense at-
                                                          
 280.  See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 20, at 159. 
 281.  Holder Memo, supra note 42. 
 282.  Id. 
 283.  See, e.g., HARLAN GOTTLIEB & KEVIN L. PHELPS, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, THE 
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK § 3:8 (5th ed. Supp. 2016) (“[I]n practice 
today, global settlements are more likely to be ‘parallel settlements’ or ‘coordinated settlements.’  
If the Government commences an investigation of your company, you should actively pursue a 
settlement to resolve all criminal, civil, and administrative disputes with each interested party, in-
cluding the Civil and Criminal Divisions of the DOJ, the relevant administrative agencies, prime 
and subcontractors, and any ‘qui tam’ private plaintiffs.”).   
 284.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)–(3).  These exceptions permit courts to authorize disclosure 
of grand jury evidence “preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.”  FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i).  In order to obtain such a judicial order, however, regulators must satisfy 
the relatively high burden of showing a “particularized need” for the grand jury materials to be 
disclosed.  United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 442–45 (1983).  Moreover, this excep-
tion does not apply to civil regulatory investigations that will result in administrative proceedings 
or which otherwise are unrelated to an actual or prospective judicial proceeding.  See United 
States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 480–83 (1983). 
 285.  I-1; I-8; see also Holder Memo, supra note 42 (advising that, in cases that are likely to 
involve parallel proceeding, “prosecutors should, at least as an initial matter, consider using inves-
tigative means other than grand jury subpoenas for documents or witness testimony”). 
 286.  I-4.  
 287.  Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Rule Permitting Knock and 
Talk Visits Under Fourth Amendment and State Constitutions, 15 A.L.R. 6th 515 (2006) (defining 
“[k]nock and talk [as] a procedure used by law enforcement officers, under which they approach 
the door of a residence seeking to speak to the inhabitants, typically to obtain more information 
regarding a criminal investigation or to obtain consent to search where probable cause is lack-
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torneys and former prosecutors have suggested that this technique is partic-
ularly effective in the type of white-collar cases for which parallel proceed-
ings are common.288  Once the case has proceeded further, the prosecutor 
and civil regulators can conduct witness interviews jointly, or the prosecu-
tor can unilaterally conduct an interview that it summarizes for the regula-
tor.289  Thus, with adequate planning, a federal prosecutor can build a crim-
inal investigation so as to facilitate coordination with civil authorities. 
Potential wiretap evidence may also incentivize coordination.290  Civil 
regulators lack a statutory basis to conduct wiretaps, and federal prosecutors 
are likely prohibited from directly disclosing wiretapped conversations to 
civil regulators under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968.291  If a federal criminal case is already underway, then 
regulators can obtain wiretap evidence from the defendants themselves 
through civil discovery.292  Therefore, a civil regulator could potentially 
reap the benefits of a federal criminal investigation without incurring the 
costs of coordination.  Nevertheless, a collaborative relationship with feder-
al prosecutors could motivate criminal authorities to provide agencies with 
the information necessary to know that they should make discovery re-
quests to defendants that will yield wiretap evidence. 
If the costs of coordinating become too great, however, civil regulators 
have most of the procedural tools they need to obtain this information inde-
pendently—to “make” rather than “buy” the investigation—if they have the 
resources to do so.293  Unlike the remedies that are uniquely available to 
criminal prosecutors, the investigative resources of civil regulators are 
comparable to those of U.S. Attorneys in parallel enforcement cases.  When 
investigating “outside” the grand jury in order to share information with a 
civil regulator, the investigative tools that are available to prosecutors—
including administrative subpoenas and search warrants—are not notably 
                                                          
ing”); id. (“Given that the presence of law enforcement officers at one’s doorstep has an inherent 
natural element of coercion, a knock and talk encounter does not implicate constitutional prohibi-
tions against unlawful seizures, so long as the encounter remains consensual and does not rise to 
the level of a seizure.”). 
 288.  I-1; I-4. 
 289.  See, e.g., United States v. Martoma, 990 F. Supp. 2d 458, 461–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (de-
scribing prosecutors and regulators employing both of these techniques in a parallel insider trading 
investigation). 
 290.  See White, supra note 1. 
 291.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012).  In SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2010), the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office filed an amicus brief conceding that such direct disclosures of wiretaps to 
the SEC are prohibited “without any law enforcement purpose and solely to assist the SEC in a 
civil case.”  Id. at 174.  For an argument that such direct disclosures are in fact permitted, see Al-
exandra N. Mogul, Note, Behind Enemy Phone Lines: Insider Trading, Parallel Enforcement, and 
Sharing the Fruits of Wiretaps, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247 (2015). 
 292.  See United States v. Gupta, 848 F. Supp. 2d 491, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 293.  See supra Part III.A. 
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stronger than those at the civil regulator’s disposal.294  Moreover, a civil 
regulator does not necessarily need to rely on the prosecutor’s goodwill in 
order to benefit from their investigation.  Rather than collaborating with a 
prosecutor, a civil enforcer could theoretically piggyback on the prosecu-
tor’s investigation and use the civil discovery process to obtain wiretap evi-
dence and other valuable information.295 
For civil regulators, there are a number of potential costs of parallel 
enforcement that might lead them to select one prosecutor’s office over an-
other, or to decline to collaborate with any prosecutor at all.  Three costs, in 
particular, were a recurrent theme in my interviews with current and former 
regulators.  First, civil enforcers are sensitive to the possibility that prosecu-
tors will “unreasonably” try to slow down an investigation.296  As one for-
mer CFTC attorney observed, regulators recognize that prosecutors must 
sometimes make reasonable requests to delay the civil investigation.297  
Moreover, prosecutorial declinations appear not to generate significant ten-
sions between prosecutors and the referring agency because regulators are 
aware that prosecutors have legitimate reasons for declining a case.298  It 
becomes a serious problem for the CFTC, however, if prosecutors attempt 
to slow things down, and thus, interfere with regulatory objectives, simply 
because they have other things on their plate.299 
Second, and relatedly, parallel enforcement creates the risk that civil 
regulators will not receive the credit that they believe they deserve for their 
work.  Both prosecutors and civil attorneys are sensitive to this risk.  For 
example, the Holder Memo instructs DOJ attorneys that “[i]t is vital that in-
vestigators obtain appropriate credit for all of their work in support of the 
government’s remedies, including civil and administrative remedies.”300  
Civil regulators can seek to minimize the risk by advertising their contribu-
tions to a parallel proceeding.  For example, both the SEC and the CFTC 
frequently file civil actions the same day an indictment is issued, and the 
DOJ will then request a stay of the civil proceedings.301  A former senior 
official at the SEC indicated that, in his view, the only purpose of these 
simultaneous filings is to ensure that the agencies share the credit and pub-
licity that results from filing a high-profile criminal indictment.302  Even 
                                                          
 294.  See supra notes 284–285 and accompanying text. 
 295.  See supra note 292 and accompanying text. 
 296.  I-7. 
 297.  Id. 
 298.  Id. 
 299.  Id. 
 300.  Holder Memo, supra note 42. 
 301.  See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 302.  I-2; see also THOMAS C. NEWKIRK & CHRISTOPHER DEAL, JUDGES LOOK BEHIND THE 
SCREEN QUESTIONING SEC STAYS IN PARALLEL PROCEEDING 3 (Nov. 25, 2009), 
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when these stays occur, however, the relatively large megaphone that at-
tends criminal charges may lead the public (and, importantly, Congress) to 
discount the contributions of civil enforcers.303  Indeed, one former, high-
ranking SDNY prosecutor observed, “[T]he SEC will sometimes bridle at a 
request to stay the civil proceeding.”304  As this former prosecutor ex-
plained, “[I]t is difficult to stand down when you have developed a case and 
may rightfully want citizens to know that you’ve been doing your job, so 
tensions may arise from being perceived to take a back seat.  Especially if 
they’ve been building the investigation and have a solid case.”305 
Finally, former regulators noted that their agencies were sensitive to 
the threat of prosecutorial “steamrolling”—the possibility that a prosecutor 
will attempt to unreasonably control a parallel investigation.306  For exam-
ple, a prosecutor may try to insist that only one lawyer from a cooperating 
agency attend joint witness interviews and attempt to deny the agency’s en-
forcement lawyer any opportunity to ask questions during the interviews.307  
According to one former CFTC regulator, prosecutorial efforts to control a 
parallel investigation cross a line in two situations.308  First, a prosecutor 
may be so risk-averse about creating discovery that he insists on controlling 
the investigation as a knee-jerk instinct rather than evaluating the proper 
scope of cooperation on a case-by-case basis. 309  Second, a prosecutor may 
overestimate the criminal investigators’ relative competence conducting 
witness interviews in situations where the regulators have greater substan-
tive expertise than prosecutors.310 
Concern about “steamrolling” varies both between, and within, regula-
tory agencies.  For example, one former SEC senior official indicated that 
the agency’s level of enthusiasm for cooperating with criminal authorities 
varied by office.311  Attorneys at the SEC Headquarters in Washington, 
D.C., for example, would bridle at the degree to which the DOJ Securities 
Fraud Section would take over a case in which they were involved.312  
These attorneys were accordingly more reluctant to involve criminal author-
                                                          
https://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/1780/original/judges_look_behind_the_screen.pdf?1
314805431 (remarking on the “not-so-secret pact” between the SEC and the DOJ). 
 303.  Cf. Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 853, 875–86 (2014) (describing civil enforcers’ reputational incentives to seek out and publi-
cize large monetary judgments). 
 304.  I-4. 
 305.  Id. 
 306.  I-7. 
 307.  Id. 
 308.  Id. 
 309.  Id. 
 310.  Id. 
 311.  I-2. 
 312.  Id. 
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ities in an SEC investigation.313  Some of these attitudes changed when 
former prosecutors began to occupy key positions in SEC leadership, but 
the variation in enthusiasm nevertheless existed.314  Additionally, an attor-
ney familiar with the CFTC’s enforcement practices suggested that the risk 
of steamrolling has not been a significant concern in recent years.315  Per-
haps due to increased education on both the civil and criminal sides, prose-
cutors may have realized that the risks of cooperative enforcement are not 
what they might have initially perceived them to be, and that the benefits of 
cooperation far outweigh the potential risks.316 
This perspective suggests that experienced regulators have internal-
ized—without necessarily articulating—that whether to engage in parallel 
enforcement is a cost-benefit decision.  Regulators try to manage the asso-
ciated risks of coordination, and thus reduce the hold-up costs of parallel 
enforcement.  For example, an attorney with recent CFTC experience ex-
plained that, when prosecutors cross a line in attempting to control a paral-
lel investigation, regulators can usually push back by stressing the benefits 
of cooperation.317  A regulator may point out, for example, that her agency 
may have more expertise in the relevant market, and that the criminal inves-
tigators on a given case are not significantly more skilled at witness inter-
views than the enforcement lawyers.318 
In the short run, regulators could choose to pursue a case unilaterally 
while continuing to reap the benefits that attend cooperative enforcement.  
Specifically, a regulator could “free ride” off a prosecutor’s efforts without 
cooperating in a parallel proceeding.  For example, a regulator could choose 
to wait until a prosecutor obtains a conviction and simply piggyback off the 
criminal investigation.  Over time, however, this strategy will come at a 
cost.  If civil regulators consistently free ride off of prosecutions that they 
decline to assist, prosecutors may be less willing to provide them the infor-
mation and support, or may even decline referrals from a recalcitrant agen-
cy.  Hence, the repeat-game structure of parallel enforcement ensures that, 
over time, a civil regulator will face a choice between “buying” prosecuto-
rial resources through collaboration and “making” those resources through 
in-house investments. 
                                                          
 313.  Id. 
 314.  Id. 
 315.  I-8. 
 316.  Id. 
 317.  I-7. 
 318.  Id. 
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2.  Benefits and Costs to Prosecutors 
For prosecutors, the benefits and costs of parallel proceedings differ in 
some respects from those of regulators.  As to benefits, parallel enforcement 
enables prosecutors to leverage the substantive expertise, remedial options, 
and investigative resources of civil enforcement agencies.  First, parallel 
proceedings enable prosecutors to leverage the substantive expertise of civil 
regulatory agencies.319  This expertise can benefit prosecutors at both the 
investigative and litigation stages of a proceeding.  For example, as an at-
torney familiar with the CFTC’s enforcement practices explained, prosecu-
tors can expedite a plea agreement by having an agency investigator with 
substantive expertise attend a proffer and ask perceptive questions about the 
trades in question.320  Additionally, this attorney explained that CFTC in-
vestigators can serve as experts on the financial products or trades at issue 
in a criminal trial, and the agency has connections with outside experts that 
prosecutors can leverage in a parallel investigation.321 
Second, as with regulators, parallel proceedings offer prosecutors a 
modest expansion of the remedies available to achieve their desired regula-
tory aims.322  A civil enforcement decision has no collateral estoppel value 
for a criminal prosecution.323  However, it can provide monetary remedies 
otherwise beyond a prosecutor’s reach.  For example, Section 304 of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act—sometimes known as the Act’s “clawback provi-
                                                          
 319.  See, e.g., Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal 
and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1867 (1992) (“Administrative agencies have special expertise 
in identifying and assessing violations.  They have firsthand experience with potential offenders 
and with the substantive law over which they have regulatory authority.”); Miheer Mhatre, Note, 
Parallel or Paralyzed? Sklena, Rule 804(b)(1), and the Costly Implications for Interagency Law 
Enforcement Efforts, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 546, 566–67 (2013) (“In addition to facilitating 
broader impact for government resources, parallel proceedings uniquely generate opportunities for 
expertise pooling.” (footnote omitted)). 
 320.  I-8. 
 321.  Id.  Similarly, SEC staff attorneys will sometimes appear as lay and expert witnesses in 
criminal cases that are a part of a parallel proceeding.  See, e.g., United States v. Georgiou, 777 
F.3d 125, 142–44 (3d Cir. 2015) (upholding the district court’s admission of lay witness testimony 
by an SEC employee concerning observations he made in connection with the SEC investigation); 
United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that an SEC expert’s testimony 
was impermissibly conclusory but acknowledging that “no sustainable objection could have been 
made” if the testimony had been more limited). 
 322.  For a discussion and critique of the prosecutor as a regulatory entity in the white-collar 
context, see Rachel E. Barkow, The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency, in PROSECUTORS IN THE 
BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 177 (Anthony S. 
Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011). 
 323.  See E. H. Schopler, Annotation, Conviction or Acquittal in Criminal Prosecution as Bar 
to Action for Statutory Damages or Penalty, 42 A.L.R.2d 634 (1955) (“Since an acquittal on crim-
inal charges may represent only an adjudication of insufficient proof to overcome all reasonable 
doubt of accused’s guilt, and does not constitute an adjudication on preponderance of evidence 
burden applicable in civil proceedings, a criminal acquittal does not operate as collateral estoppel 
on issues in subsequent civil proceeding . . . .”). 
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sion”—enables the SEC to seek the forfeiture of bonuses and other forms of 
equity-based compensation.324  This provision is particularly attractive to 
regulators because it can be imposed without jury findings to support dis-
gorgement and can apply against individual defendants.325  According to 
one former federal prosecutor, the availability of this clawback provision is 
an attractive feature of parallel proceedings against individual defendants.326 
The most significant advantages that prosecutors can obtain from par-
allel enforcement, however, are investigative in nature.  For example, some 
have argued that parallel proceedings ratchet up the costs of using criminal 
procedure rights to resist a government investigation.327  In practice, the 
costs of a criminal conviction are usually so dire that experienced lawyers 
will counsel defendants to accept an adverse inference in a civil proceeding 
in order to reduce their risk of conviction.328  In some cases, however, the 
costs of remaining silent in a civil proceeding will indeed persuade defend-
ants to testify in that proceeding, ultimately to the benefit of prosecutors.329 
My interviews revealed several other benefits to using parallel investi-
gations to build a criminal investigation that scholars had previously over-
looked.  For example, one former prosecutor observed that having a civil 
regulator initiate an investigation could help determine whether a criminal 
investigation is warranted.330  Moreover, both prosecutors and regulators 
observed a number of small ways in which parallel proceedings benefit 
from having civil regulators take the lead in an investigation, including the 
fact that “witnesses are less wary of talking” during a civil proceeding.331  
In addition, beginning a parallel proceeding with civil investigation can re-
duce the press attention that a case attracts, which is desirable under many 
circumstances.332 
                                                          
 324.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2012). 
 325.  See SEC v. Jasper, 678 F.3d 1116, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that because “the reim-
bursement provision of [15 U.S.C. § 7243] is considered an equitable disgorgement remedy and 
not a legal penalty,” a defendant “is not entitled to have a jury find all of the facts necessary to 
support the reimbursement”). 
 326.  I-1. 
 327.  See supra note 79. 
 328.  See supra notes 276–279 and accompanying text. 
 329.  As one experienced defense attorney explained, this decision can be motivated by a (typ-
ically misguided) desire to avoid attracting prosecutorial interest in a matter: “[I]f the SEC starts 
an investigation, and you’re concerned about your client’s exposure criminally, and you assert the 
Fifth to deposition questions—then you’re pretty much inviting the United States Attorney to get 
interested in the case.  So some lawyers take a shot and are cooperative with the SEC in the hope 
that they never bring in the US Attorney.”  I-10.  Such a strategy, in the view of this attorney, is 
“very dangerous.”  Id. 
 330.  I-4. 
 331.  Id. 
 332.  Id. 
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Additionally, civil regulators are often better positioned than prosecu-
tors to learn about and inquire into wrongdoing.  Because financial miscon-
duct is often difficult and costly to detect,333 both civil and criminal regula-
tors lack the resources to seek out wrongdoing without the assistance of the 
media or outside actors.334  Prosecutors have powerful resources for gener-
ating cases (including the promise of leniency for those who reach out to 
them about criminal conduct they have committed).  Both civil and criminal 
enforcers frequently must rely upon whistleblowers to learn about potential 
misconduct.335  In the securities context, the SEC is currently authorized to 
pay substantial awards to individuals who provide the agency with infor-
mation leading to a successful enforcement action yielding over $1 mil-
lion.336  This provision makes whistleblowing sufficiently lucrative for in-
dividuals to take substantial risks in order to bring compelling information 
to the SEC.337 
Even leaving whistleblower payouts aside, staffing and institutional 
considerations may make civil regulators better positioned to discover cer-
tain types of new cases through whistleblowers.  For instance, the staffs of 
many civil agencies often belong to the same professional networks as those 
whom they are regulating.338  The SEC, for example, attempts to recruit 
                                                          
 333.  Cf. Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis 
of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 706 (1997) (observing that intentional 
corporate misconduct “is often uniquely difficult to detect because it is deliberately hidden”). 
 334.  See Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 646–47 (2010); Daniel C. Richman, Cor-
porate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 273 (2014).  For a recent example of the 
SEC’s and DOJ’s coordinated effort to incentivize disclosures of wrongdoing, see Carmen Ger-
maine, SEC, DOJ Not Fooling Many With Easy FCPA Deals, LAW360 (June 8, 2016, 10:29 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/804906/sec-DOJ-not-fooling-many-with-easy-fcpa-deals (de-
scribing the effects of the new Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Pilot Program that offers substantial 
civil and criminal penalty discounts to companies that cooperate with investigators and disgorge 
unlawful gains). 
 335.  See generally Miriam H. Baer, Reconceptualizing the Whistleblower’s Dilemma, 50 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 2215 (2017). 
 336.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act § 922, 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012). 
 337.  See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Issues $17 Million Whistleblower Award (June 9, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-114.html (reporting that the SEC has “award-
ed more than $85 million to 32 whistleblowers since the program’s inception in 2011” and that the 
largest single whistleblower payout was $30 million).  The CFTC has a similar whistleblower 
program.  See 7 U.S.C. § 26 (2012).  That agency’s payouts, however, have thus far been smaller 
and fewer in number.  See Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Announces Fourth Whistleblower Award 
(July 26, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7411-16 (announcing that the 
agency issued its fourth award of $50,000 and that its largest payout had thus far been $10 mil-
lion). 
 338.  See, e.g., Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265 (2015) 
(analyzing empirical work documenting the extent and effects of the revolving door between 
agencies and the industries they regulate). 
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employees with professional experience in regulated industries,339 and its 
staff returns to those industries in large numbers after leaving the agency.340  
These contacts might lead industry insiders to feel more comfortable reach-
ing out to SEC staff than FBI agents—who often have backgrounds and 
training different from those working in white-collar industries—about po-
tential wrongdoing.341  Additionally, the SEC has structured its bureaucracy 
so that staff with a diverse range of expertise will evaluate tips, complaints, 
and referrals that come into the agency.  Specifically, as a former senior of-
ficer at the SEC explained,  
the goal in establishing the agency’s Office of Market Intelli-
gence was to create an information intake office that combined 
expertise in market surveillance, data analytics, and accounting 
alongside the substantive legal expertise of staff who liaise spe-
cifically with the SEC’s specialized units, including asset man-
agement, FCPA, structured and new products, market abuse, and 
municipal securities and public pensions.342   
Thus, by collaborating with the SEC, prosecutors can buy into an institu-
tional structure that prioritizes a careful substantive review of a wide range 
of information. 
Such collaboration comes at the cost, however, of coordinating with 
civil agencies with different training and priorities.343  With respect to the 
SEC, for example, one former prosecutor explained, “[T]he SEC is not a 
criminal enforcement organization and the SDNY sometimes had concerns 
                                                          
 339.  SEC, REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SEC ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM 
RECOMMENDATIONS 21 (2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/secorgreformreport-
2012-df967.pdf (reporting on structural reforms in the agency that include “[r]ecruitment of indus-
try experts, and continued enhancement of expertise of existing SEC staff through targeted train-
ing in critical areas”); Mary L. Schapiro, Chair, SEC, Remarks at the Practising Law Institute’s 
SEC Speaks (Feb. 24, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012-spch022412mlshtm.html 
(“We broadened our hiring approach, searching for recruits with financial industry backgrounds 
and specialized experience.  We now have traders, asset managers, academics and quants on staff 
in addition to attorneys, economists and accountants, giving us a correspondingly greater insight 
into the technologies and practices that drive today’s financial markets.”). 
 340.  See generally PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, REVOLVING REGULATORS: SEC FACES 
ETHICS CHALLENGES WITH REVOLVING DOOR (2011), http://www.pogo.org/our-
work/reports/2011/fo-fra-20110513.html (summarizing and criticizing the number of SEC staff 
that go on to work in regulated industries). 
 341.  See Richman, supra note 28, at 789–90. 
 342.  I-12.  This language tracks the SEC’s organization of specialized units when the OMI 
was formed in 2010.  Id.  The Structured and New Products Unit has been replaced with the Com-
plex Financial Instruments Unit.  Id. 
 343.  Cf. Lynch, supra note 23, at 33 (“Administrative agencies may be insensitive to the spe-
cial demands of the criminal process, and may be frustrated with prosecutors’ reluctance to pursue 
cases that seem to the administrators a significant part of their enforcement program but that fail 
to meet prosecutors’ criteria for imposing criminal punishment or for likely success before ju-
ries.”). 
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about coordinating with them because of the differences in their legal re-
sponsibilities and objectives.”344  Two potential costs significantly influence 
prosecutors’ decisions of when, whether, and how to collaborate with civil 
regulators. 
First, in some cases, a prosecutor might be frustrated by the slow speed 
of the enforcement bureaucracy in civil regulatory agencies.  As one former 
Southern District of New York prosecutor explained, “[T]he SDNY can be 
prepared to bring a complaint in as long as it takes to write up a complaint, 
and get an agent to swear to it, take it to a magistrate judge, and get the ar-
rest warrant signed.”345  By contrast, “the SEC has all sorts of internal ap-
proval requirements, and processes they need to go through, and get ap-
provals to bring cases that the DOJ just doesn’t have.”346  There are, 
accordingly, situations in which “the DOJ is ready to bring a case, and the 
SEC is not.”347 
The more serious risk for prosecutors, however, is that a civil regulator 
might compromise a criminal investigation by forcing a U.S. Attorney’s Of-
fice to reveal its interest in a defendant too early.  This risk arises from the 
transparency norms that govern many agencies’ civil investigations.  The 
SEC Enforcement Manual, for example, typically provides individuals un-
der investigation with a “Wells notice.”  The notice informs the individual 
of the specific charges that the agency staff are contemplating and provides 
the individual with the opportunity to dissuade staff members from recom-
mending charges to the Commission.348  Federal prosecutors, by contrast, 
are well practiced in maintaining the secrecy of an investigation.  In princi-
ple, the United States Attorneys’ Manual “encourage[s]” prosecutors to no-
tify the “target” of an investigation “a reasonable time before seeking an in-
                                                          
 344.  I-4. 
 345.  I-6. 
 346.  Id. 
 347.  Id. 
 348.  See SEC, supra note 60, § 2.4 (describing the “Wells process” and defining a “Wells no-
tice” as “a communication from the staff to a person involved in an investigation that: (1) informs 
the person the staff has made a preliminary determination to recommend that the Commission file 
an action or institute a proceeding against them; (2) identifies the securities law violations that the 
staff has preliminarily determined to include in the recommendation; and (3) provides notice that 
the person may make a submission to the Division and the Commission concerning the proposed 
recommendation”); see also 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) (2018).  At times, the agency may diverge from 
these formal policies of transparency.  With respect to the Wells process, for example, one former 
senior official at the SEC indicated that there is sometimes considerable resistance on the part of 
the agency’s staff to the disclosures that are required under the Enforcement Manual.  I-2.  The 
reason for this resistance, according to this former official (who was critical of the practice), is 
that the agency’s settlements will be reduced if the target of an investigation is able to write a bet-
ter Wells submission.  Id.  Nevertheless, this official indicated that the SEC is traditionally an 
agency of full disclosure and that transparency norms still inform high-level decisionmaking.  Id. 
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dictment.”349  In practice, some experienced U.S. Attorney’s Offices rarely 
provide such notification to individuals under investigation.  Prosecutors in 
the SDNY, for example, “rarely give target letters, because they rarely des-
ignate people as targets until the charges are brought . . . .  Usually someone 
is not a target until the prosecutor is walking to the grand jury with the in-
dictment. Until then they might be a ‘super subject,’ but they’re not a target 
yet.”350 
The divergent approaches of civil and criminal enforcers with respect 
to transparency can create tensions in the parallel proceedings context.  Ac-
cording to the former SDNY prosecutor, the SEC and a U.S. Attorney’s Of-
fice “can sometimes have different interests on when to formally bring a 
case.”351  As this attorney explained: 
When an SEC case gets announced, they usually issue a press re-
lease and bring the case, and it’ll be very publicly known.  And to 
the extent that there is an investigation going on the criminal side, 
any chance of doing covert investigation, or of the investigation 
not being known, is obviously blown once an SEC case comes 
out.  So sometimes there is interest on the DOJ side to hold off on 
things before a case is actually brought.352 
Another former SDNY prosecutor indicated, however, the SEC is 
sometimes reluctant to postpone their enforcement actions to the degree that 
a prosecutor might prefer.353  More specifically, this prosecutor observed 
that “the SEC became on certain occasions less willing to stay cases” after 
the appointment of veteran SDNY prosecutor Robert Khuzami as Enforce-
ment Director in 2009.354 
A second cost of collaborating is the threat that civil regulators will 
compromise a criminal prosecution by adding to the prosecutor’s discovery 
burdens.  Under Brady v. Maryland355 and Giglio v. United States,356 prose-
cutors have an affirmative obligation to disclose material evidence that is 
“favorable to an accused.”357  In addition, the Jencks Act requires prosecu-
tors to disclose any statement of a testifying witness that is “in the posses-
sion of the United States” if the statement “relates to the subject matter as to 
                                                          
 349.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 46, § 9-11.153. 
 350.  I-6. 
 351.  Id. 
 352.  Id. 
 353.  I-4 
 354.  Id. 
 355.  373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 356.  405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 357.  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.  For a more detailed explanation of the doctrine established by 
Brady and its progeny, see Baer, supra note 38, at 11–15. 
 1044 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:985 
 
which the witness has testified.”358  Thus, Brady and its progeny impose an 
affirmative duty on prosecutors to review evidence that is in the possession 
of investigators from outside agencies who are part of the prosecution’s in-
vestigative team.359  In fact, in two recent, high-profile insider trading cases 
involving parallel proceedings, judges in the SDNY have held that the pros-
ecutors had an affirmative duty to disclose Brady material that was in the 
possession of the SEC.360  In each of these cases, the court held that the 
“parallel” DOJ and SEC enforcement efforts were sufficiently well coordi-
nated to count as a “joint investigation” for Brady purposes.361  The current 
and former prosecutors and regulators interviewed were sensitive to the im-
plications of these decisions and reasonably assumed that courts will stand 
ready to apply the same rule to Jencks material.362 
                                                          
 358.  18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (2012); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.  In practice, the government 
will disclose such statements in advance of a witness’s testimony in order to avoid unnecessary 
trial delays.  See United States v. Garcia, 406 F. Supp. 2d 304, 305–06 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (observ-
ing that “[i]n practice, the procedure described in the [Jencks Act] has proved unworkable” and 
that “[e]arly disclosure of 3500 material . . . facilitates trial efficiency by avoiding lengthy recess-
es during trial”).  When speaking loosely, prosecutors will sometimes refer to these disclosure du-
ties—including those under the Jencks Act—as their Brady obligations.  I draw this inference 
from my professional and social interactions as well as from my interviews of current and former 
prosecutors.  For concision’s sake, this Article will follow the same convention except where 
greater precision is warranted. 
 359.  Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (holding that, under Brady, prosecutors have 
a “duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf 
in the case”); see also United States v. Ramirez, 174 F.3d 584, 588 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that, 
under the Jencks Act, prosecutors have a duty to disclose statements in the custody of the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons); United States v. Bufalino, 576 F.2d 446, 449 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that there 
is “no longer any excuse for official ignorance” concerning the government’s obligation under the 
Jencks Act and Rule 16 to disclose material in the FBI’s possession); United States v. Bryant, 439 
F.2d 642, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that “[t]he duty of disclosure” under the Jencks Act “af-
fects not only the prosecutor, but the Government as a whole, including its investigative agen-
cies”), abrogated on other grounds by Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).  As a formal 
policy matter, the Department of Justice acknowledges that in parallel proceedings a civil regula-
tory agency can be “part of the prosecution team for discovery purposes” and “encourage[s]” 
prosecutors “to err on the side of inclusiveness when identifying the members of the prosecution 
team for discovery purposes.”  Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General David W. Ogden on 
Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery to DOJ Prosecutors (Jan. 4, 2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/dag/memorandum-department-prosecutors [hereinafter Ogden Memo]. 
 360.  United States v. Martoma, 990 F. Supp. 2d 458, 460–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); United States 
v. Gupta, 848 F. Supp. 2d 491, 493–95 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 361.  See Martoma, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 461 (holding that a joint investigation occurred where 
the SEC and the U.S. Attorney’s Office began communications shortly after prosecutors com-
menced their investigation, the agencies “jointly conducted twenty interviews of twelve witness-
es,” the SEC provided prosecutors with documents it obtained through civil discovery, and the 
agencies coordinated their depositions); see also Gupta, F. Supp. 2d at 493–95 (holding that a 
joint investigation occurred where the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the SEC had jointly conducted 
44 witness interviews). 
 362.  This assumption is consistent with several Second Circuit cases implying that a “joint 
investigation” generates a responsibility for prosecutors to seek out and review witnesses in the 
possession of outside agencies.  See, e.g., United States v. Paternina-Vergara, 749 F.2d 993, 998 
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My interviews suggest that Brady obligations factor heavily in prose-
cutors’ decisions concerning whether, and how, to coordinate with regula-
tors.  As one former SDNY prosecutor explained in the course of discussing 
coordination between that office and the SEC, “[T]he SEC is not a criminal 
enforcement organization and the SDNY sometimes had concerns about 
coordinating with them because of the differences in their legal responsibili-
ties and objectives.”363  Interestingly, however, my sources did not express 
any concern that civil regulators would withhold evidence that prosecutors 
had an affirmative duty to disclose.  One former senior officer at the SEC 
indicated that this risk is largely illusory because once a prosecutor makes 
an access request, the SEC will hold nothing back that is requested.364  
Thus, the close coordination that is the hallmark of modern parallel pro-
ceedings serves to obviate one common concern of prosecutors with respect 
to Brady obligations. 
A more significant concern for prosecutors, however, is the risk that 
civil regulators will inadvertently “create” Brady/Giglio and Jencks prob-
lems.365  Specifically, prosecutors worry that civil investigators might me-
morialize jointly conducted witness interviews in ways that will compro-
mise the criminal case.  The former prosecutors who expressed this concern 
took their Brady obligations seriously, and understood that the government 
must disclose exculpatory information that a witness communicates verbal-
ly regardless of whether the statement was committed to paper.366  Howev-
er, by failing to be sufficiently precise in how they memorialize interviews, 
civil enforcers might “create” Brady material based on witness statements 
that are not in fact exculpatory.  The divergent objectives of civil regulators 
and prosecutors create the risk that regulators will be relatively “less sensi-
tive to the need for precision” in relaying a witness’s testimony.367  Accord-
ing to one former, high-ranking SDNY prosecutor, this Brady concern has 
two dimensions: “First, you worry that you as the prosecutor are now re-
sponsible for what is in their files and how they wrote it.  Second, they may 
                                                          
(2d Cir. 1984) (holding that “even in the course of a joint investigation undertaken by United 
States and foreign law enforcement officials the most the Jencks Act requires of United States of-
ficials is a good-faith effort to obtain the statements of prosecution witnesses in the possession of 
the foreign government”); see also United States v. Bin Laden, 397 F. Supp. 2d 465, 480–84 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that the U.S. Marshals Service was part of a “prosecution team” for 
Jencks Act purposes based on their level of assistance to the criminal investigation). 
 363.  I-4.  In context, this statement clearly was not intended to single out the SEC as being 
less professional than other civil regulatory agencies.  To the contrary, I got the sense that all of 
the former federal prosecutors with whom I spoke held the SEC in high regard.  
 364.  I-2. 
 365.  I-4; I-1. 
 366.  I-4; I-11; see also Ogden Memo, supra note 359 (“[M]aterial exculpatory information 
that the prosecutor receives during a conversation with an agent or a witness is no less discovera-
ble than if that same information were contained in an email.”). 
 367.  I-4. 
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create Brady problems by taking post-interview notes that mischaracterize a 
witness’s testimony so that it seems exculpatory when in fact it was not.”368 
The problem of civil enforcers “creating” Brady material is particular-
ly acute when civil regulators take multiple sets of post-interview notes par-
aphrasing a witness’s statements.  The government’s disclosure obligations 
under Giglio and the Jencks Act create opportunities for skilled defense at-
torneys to exploit even minor inconsistencies between how different note-
takers characterized a witness’s statements.369  Thus, several former prose-
cutors stressed the importance of designating a single, experienced investi-
gator to take notes during witness interviews that are attended by civil and 
criminal regulators.370  “Otherwise,” said one former prosecutor, “you could 
spend the trial fighting over seven different versions of something a witness 
said.”371 
Several of these former prosecutors cited the facts underlying Judge 
Rakoff’s decision in United States v. Gupta372 as an example of the SEC in-
advertently “creating” Brady material by memorializing their after-the-fact 
recollections of a jointly conducted witness interview.  In Gupta, the SEC 
and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the SDNY (“USAO”) conducted a paral-
lel insider trading investigation that included 44 jointly conducted inter-
views.373  Consistent with the protocol that former prosecutors described in 
my interviews, the only person who took contemporaneous notes of the in-
terviews was an FBI agent who was assigned to the USAO.374  Within a day 
or two after each interview, however, an SEC attorney prepared memoranda 
summarizing his recollections of what he deemed to be relevant parts of the 
interview.375  Judge Rakoff held that, because these interviews involved 
“joint fact-gathering,” the prosecutor was required under Brady to review 
the SEC’s documents arising from the interviews and disclose any exculpa-
tory information.376  Judge Rakoff’s opinion recognized that Brady material 
can include the precise type of material that was of particular concern to the 
prosecutors I interviewed: inconsistencies between two different accounts 
of a witness interview which a skilled defense attorney could use to under-
mine the strength of the government’s criminal case.  Specifically, the gov-
ernment argued that the defendant had already received any Brady material 
contained in the SEC memoranda because prosecutors had an independent 
                                                          
 368.  Id. 
 369.  I-1. 
 370.  Id.; I-4; I-6. 
 371.  I-4. 
 372.  848 F. Supp. 2d 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 373.  Id. at 493.  
 374.  Id. 
 375.  Id. at 493–94. 
 376.  Id. at 494–95. 
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duty to disclose exculpatory portions of their agents’ notes detailing joint 
interviews.377  In rejecting this argument, Judge Rakoff observed, “The SEC 
attorney may have chosen to emphasize other parts of the witness inter-
views in his memoranda that did not make it into the FBI agent’s notes, or 
that the Government attorneys present simply forgot, and those may qualify 
as Brady material.”378 
The decision in Gupta reveals that the holdup costs can challenge even 
the most stable and longstanding inter-agency enforcement relationships.  
More than one former prosecutor specifically expressed disappointment that 
SEC staff in Gupta deviated from standard practice to memorialize their af-
ter-the-fact recollections of witness interviews.379  Such actions, speculated 
one former prosecutor, might have temporarily lowered the degree of en-
thusiasm with which SDNY lawyers approached their cases involving the 
SEC’s New York Regional Office.380  Another former prosecutor acknowl-
edged that Gupta might have created tensions between the USAO and the 
SEC’s New York Regional Office, but cautioned that it was quite accurate 
to say that the offices became less willing to work together.381  Simply put, 
the two offices need each other.382  This former prosecutor acknowledged, 
however, that there might be situations in which a U.S. Attorney’s Office 
has had such bad experiences with a civil regulator that they may be reluc-
tant to continue coordinating with it.383  This reluctance is counterbalanced, 
he added, by the institutional obligation to pursue criminal cases that agen-
cies refer to the office.384 
Notwithstanding this institutional constraint, the make-or-buy frame-
work has considerable explanatory value with respect to how prosecutors 
approach parallel proceedings.  Given the need for some influential U.S. At-
torney’s Offices to triage their cases, the costs and benefits of cooperation 
would lead them to prioritize some cases—and some agencies—over oth-
ers.  Prosecutors have a diverse set of goals and obligations, only one of 
which is to honor agency referrals.  In some situations, a prosecutor’s over-
all aims might be better served by endeavoring to discover and build a case 
internally rather than by reaching out to a regulatory agency for a promising 
referral.  Alternatively, a prosecutor might recognize an obligation to seri-
ously consider agency referrals, but may nevertheless be presented with a 
range of choices concerning which agency—and which office within an 
                                                          
 377.  Id. at 495. 
 378.  Id. 
 379.  I-1; I-4. 
 380.  I-1. 
 381.  I-4. 
 382.  Id. 
 383.  Id. 
 384.  Id. 
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agency—to work with.  The extent of overlapping jurisdiction on regulatory 
matters gives the prosecutor a range of agencies with which to cooperate.385  
On many securities matters, for example, a prosecutor may choose between 
coordinating with the SEC or the CFTC.386  Even when jurisdictional over-
lap does not exist, a prosecutor could choose to work more closely with a 
regional office of an agency that it deems particularly competent, while re-
jecting referrals from regional offices that have developed a reputation for 
trouble.  Thus, without lowering their overall declination rate, a prosecutor 
might assess the costs of parallel proceedings when deciding which refer-
rals to accept. 
IV.  INTERDEPENDENCE AND AGENCY DESIGN 
This Article has shown that, in the parallel proceeding context, an 
agency’s expertise will fluctuate based on the behaviors of the agencies 
with which it is coordinating.  Applying the make-or-buy framework, this 
Part examines specific instances of this type of inter-dependent fluctuation.  
Specifically, it will examine ways in which inter-agency relationships 
shaped the relative expertise of prosecutors and regulators with respect to 
the investigation skills, litigating prowess, and substantive knowledge nec-
essary to pursue complex regulatory cases. 
In doing so, this analysis yields two important insights about inter-
agency coordination in parallel proceedings and beyond.  First, even when 
an agency must reform for reasons unrelated to its parallel enforcement re-
lationships—as the SEC did in response to the Bernie Madoff scandal—the 
make-or-buy decision will influence which reforms the agency chooses to 
adopt.  Second, rather than building its own expertise, the make-or-buy de-
cision will sometimes lead an agency to invest in building the expertise of 
another agency.  For example, an improvement in a prosecutor’s ability to 
pursue complex regulatory cases might not simply be the product of the 
prosecutor’s own choices: it might also reflect a civil regulator’s deliberate 
strategy to improve its own regulatory enforcement outcomes. 
A.  Investigation and Litigation Expertise 
Prosecutors’ offices are structured to cultivate investigation and litiga-
tion expertise.  Prosecutors begin trying cases early in their careers and thus 
                                                          
 385.  See generally Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Adminis-
trative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 214 (2006).  
 386.  Although the CFTC has historically lacked jurisdiction over insider trading offenses, the 
Dodd-Frank Act granted such jurisdiction.  See 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 180 (2018); In re 
Arya Motazedi, CFTC Docket No. 16-02, 2015 WL 7880066 (Dec. 2, 2015). 
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tend to accrue more trial experience than civil regulatory attorneys.387  
Moreover, they can rely upon the relatively well-resourced FBI to investi-
gate their cases, and can call upon other criminal investigative agencies 
such as the Secret Service (which has expertise in financial crimes).388  
Theoretically, the DOJ could strategically build its investigation expertise 
in order to be less reliant on having the SEC and other regulatory agencies 
for case referrals.  I have found no evidence, however, suggesting that the 
DOJ has adopted this strategy.  To the contrary, one of the former high-
ranking prosecutors with whom I spoke indicated that prosecutors felt a 
sense of institutional obligation to pursue cases referred to them by civil 
regulatory agencies.389  Moreover, the relatively decentralized structure of 
U.S. Attorneys’ offices ensures that federal prosecutors accumulate consid-
erable enforcement expertise, including trial experience, at early stages in 
their careers.390  Since they are in the business of prosecuting crimes, a U.S. 
Attorney’s Office is unlikely to restructure itself to deprive its staff of liti-
gation experience simply because it has the option of cooperating with 
competent litigators from another agency.391 
By contrast, civil regulatory agencies can make strategic institutional 
design choices that shape their relationships with prosecutors, and are per-
haps influenced by those prosecutors.  Consider, for example, a series of re-
forms that have strengthened the SEC’s reputation as an aggressive regula-
tor.392  The SEC has traditionally had a hierarchical organizational structure 
and enforcement incentives which led it to prioritize easy-to-settle cases 
over those that required more extensive litigation.393  Until recently, this 
                                                          
 387.  See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE 
177–78 (2015) (describing the relative trial expertise of Assistant U.S. Attorneys and SEC staff 
and citing it as a reason for the SEC’s trial aversion).  
 388.  See generally Richman, supra note 28. 
 389.  I-4. 
 390.  See COFFEE, supra note 387, at 177–78; see also Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, 
Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 583, 607 & n.78 (2005) (citing literature finding that prosecutors have the discretion and 
incentives to choose cases with the aim of gaining trial experience). 
 391.  However, since more than ninety-seven percent of federal convictions are the result of 
guilty pleas, perhaps one should not take for granted that a prosecutor’s office will necessarily 
continue to emphasize trial expertise.  See DOJ, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, Table 5.22.2010 (2010), 
www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf (reporting that 87,418 of the 89,741 defendants 
convicted of federal crimes in 2010—or 97.4%—had entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere). 
 392.  See Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 610 (2012) (“[S]ince 
the discovery of Bernard Madoff’s fraud in December 2008 (precipitated solely by Madoff’s star-
tling admission), the SEC’s Enforcement Division has recast itself as an all-purpose investigator 
and punisher.”). 
 393.  See BOSTON CONSULTING GRP., U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: 
ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY AND REFORM 180 (2011) [hereinafter BCG Report], 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/967study.pdf (describing the SEC’s hierarchical organiza-
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contributed to the SEC staff’s reputation for having inadequate investiga-
tion and litigation experience, and for being overeager to settle egregious 
cases.394  In a scathing 2009 report, the SEC cited this lack of experience as 
a reason for the agency’s mishandling of Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.395  
In response to this report, the SEC enacted a number of reforms to improve 
its enforcement expertise and, in doing so, strengthened its leverage vis-à-
vis criminal authorities in the parallel proceedings context.  The change be-
gan in 2009 with the hiring of veteran SDNY prosecutor Robert Khuzami to 
lead the SEC’s Enforcement Division.  Khuzami made at least four signifi-
cant changes to the agency’s enforcement practices. 
First, under Khuzami, former federal prosecutors occupied the En-
forcement Division’s top leadership positions.396  Significantly, the SEC re-
cruited these former prosecutors from outside the agency rather than taking 
the traditional step of promoting career staff to top deputy positions.397  
                                                          
tion and an incentive structure whereby “enforcement success was informally measured by statis-
tics (i.e. number of cases) and high profile cases, resulting in internal competition for ‘hot’ cases 
and limited information sharing across teams”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-
261, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: IMPROVING PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IS 
CRITICAL FOR AGENCY’S EFFECTIVENESS 17 (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655989.pdf 
(confirming the findings of the SEC Inspector General that the SEC’s incentive structure has led 
to an “increased focus on easier, ‘slam dunk’ cases over those cases that looked to be complex and 
more time consuming”).  The relationship between the CFTC’s organizational structure and its 
enforcement outcomes has received far less attention than the SEC’s.  As one CFTC attorney ex-
plained, there are some significant organizational differences between the SEC’s and the CFTC’s 
respective enforcement divisions.  I-8.  The SEC, for example, divides its enforcement resources 
into investigative teams and trial teams.  Id.  At the CFTC, by contrast, the trial attorneys and in-
vestigative attorneys are on the same working team “from day one.”  Id.  This reflects a “different 
philosophy” from the SEC’s, and enables trial attorneys to provide input and make calls on ques-
tions of admissibility and other litigation-related questions.  Id.  Nevertheless, the agency’s over-
arching organizational structure is substantially similar, see CFTC Organization, CFTC, 
http://www.cftc.gov/About/CFTCOrganization/index.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2018), and the 
agency has been subject to similar criticisms regarding its desire to pursue easily settled cases.  
See, e.g., Richman, supra note 334, at 274 (discussing the desirability of “institutional design 
measures that reduce pressure on the SEC, CFTC, and other agencies to focus on quantity, not 
quality”). 
 394.  COFFEE, supra note 387, at 177–78 (stating that a “favorite explanation of the defense bar 
and some judges” for the SEC’s inadequate enforcement during the 2008 Financial Crisis was that 
“the SEC’s attorneys generally lack trial experience, and it would prefer to settle than risk a loss”); 
John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s Perspective, 76 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 57, 125 (2005) (“The SEC is currently trial averse. Indeed, the SEC litigation para-
digm for a ‘successful’ case is ‘file-and-settle.’” (footnote omitted)). 
 395.  SEC, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO 
UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME–PUBLIC VERSION 24 (2009), 
http://sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf. 
 396.  See Shannon Henson, Ex-Prosecutors Bring DOJ Tactics with Them to SEC, LAW360 
(Sept. 28, 2010, 7:45 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/187165/ex-prosecutors-bring-DOJ-
tactics-with-them-to-sec. 
 397.  See Baer, supra note 392, at 610 (noting that Khuzami “recruited two former prosecutors 
from the same United States Attorney’s Office to work for him in high-level positions”). 
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These veteran prosecutors brought with them a wealth of litigation experi-
ence that was previously available to the SEC only if it chose to collaborate 
in a parallel civil and criminal proceeding.  These recruiting efforts can thus 
be viewed as measures for empowering the agency to “make” cases if the 
costs of “buying” them were unacceptable. 
Second, the SEC restructured its Enforcement Division in ways that 
enabled its attorneys to pursue cases without relying on the litigation exper-
tise of outside prosecutors.398  For example, the SEC flattened the Enforce-
ment Division’s management structure and reassigned many supervisors to 
work as front-line investigators.399  The agency also established an Office of 
Market Intelligence (“OMI”) designed to strengthen the agency’s capacity 
to generate cases from the tips, complaints, and referrals it receives from 
outside sources.400  In addition, Khuzami streamlined the investigative pro-
cess to eliminate several layers of the internal approval processes for nego-
tiating settlements, issuing subpoenas, and opening informal investiga-
tions.401 
Third, Khuzami introduced the use of formal cooperation agreements. 
Similar to those used by federal prosecutors, these agreements incentivized 
culpable insiders to cooperate with the SEC at early stages of an investiga-
tion.402  Finally, Khuzami aggressively publicized these reforms, and in do-
ing so gained a level of media attention that is typically reserved for high-
profile U.S. Attorneys.403  A deterrence strategy familiar to high-level pros-
ecutors,404 this public relations effort communicated the SEC’s commitment 
to pursuing cases that had only recently been regarded as beyond their com-
petence. 
                                                          
 398.  For a detailed discussion and analysis of this restructuring, see Jayne W. Barnard, Evolu-
tionary Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 403, 406–
09 (2010). 
 399.  See Robert Khuzami, Testimony Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary, Testimony Concerning Investigating and Prosecuting Fraud after the Fraud Enforcement 
and Recovery Act (Sept. 22, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2010/ts092210rk.htm 
(“We reallocated a number of staff who were first level managers—some of our most experienced 
and dedicated attorneys—to the mission-critical work of conducting front-line investigations.”). 
 400.  See id.; see also supra note 342 and accompanying text (describing the design and pur-
pose of the OMI). 
 401.  See Khuzami, supra note 399. 
 402.  See id. (“[O]ur ‘cooperation agreement[]’ require[s] that cooperators provide truthful evi-
dence and testimony concerning the organizers, leaders, and managers of wrongful activity in ex-
change for a potential reduction in sanctions.”). 
 403.  Baer, supra note 392, at 611 (explaining that Khuzami “went on a public relations kick 
that included a positive depiction in the New York Times as the public’s new, star crusader”); see, 
e.g., Jenny Anderson & Zachery Kouwe, The Enforcers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2010, at B1. 
 404.  See Anthony S. Barkow & Beth George, Prosecuting Political Defendants, 44 GA. L. 
REV. 953, 1010–13 (2010) (proposing reforms to the prosecutorial use of press releases as a deter-
rence strategy). 
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These reforms enabled the SEC to litigate civil cases using techniques 
and methods that had previously been available only if the agency chose to 
cooperate with prosecutors.  As Miriam Baer has observed, Khuzami’s re-
forms served to “remake the enforcement division in the image of a local 
prosecutor’s office.”405  These reforms were evident to outsiders.  As one 
reporter explained, “[t]he SEC’s handling of civil proceedings increasingly 
resembles the DOJ’s handling of criminal cases. . . .  [F]rom their origins, 
through the investigative stage, to their completion, SEC civil proceedings 
now are involving tools and techniques more traditionally associated with 
the DOJ’s criminal proceedings.”406  Significantly, however, these reforms 
also strengthened the SEC’s reputation among the prosecutors with which it 
traditionally worked.  For example, one former high-ranking SDNY prose-
cutor observed that the SEC became on certain occasions less willing to 
stay cases after Khuzami’s reforms of the Enforcement Division.407 
Even when exogenous shocks require an agency to change its en-
forcement practices, the transaction costs of inter-agency coordination will 
influence the choice of which reforms to adopt.  One might argue, for ex-
ample, that because these reforms were the result of an exogenous shock—
the Madoff scandal—they had little to do with the make-or-buy decision in 
parallel enforcement.  This objection, however, neglects the broader institu-
tional context that informed the SEC’s restructuring.  If parallel enforce-
ment had zero transaction costs, the SEC could simply have relied on out-
side prosecutorial expertise to secure its desired enforcement outcomes in 
high-profile cases such as Madoff’s.  In this frictionless world, perhaps the 
SEC would have had to modestly reform its processes for reviewing tips, 
complaints, and referrals.  Once it learned of potential misconduct, howev-
er, it could simply outsource the case to a U.S. Attorney’s office and use 
their work to extract a civil settlement.  In reality, however, such outsourc-
ing carries costs that made it worthwhile for the SEC to develop its in-house 
enforcement expertise. 
Significantly, however, an agency’s desire to make such choices must 
be supported by the resources to do so.  For example, shortly after the SEC 
hired a former prosecutor to lead its Enforcement Division, the CFTC fol-
lowed suit by hiring David Meister, who is also a veteran SDNY prosecutor 
with experience prosecuting securities fraud.408  Under Meister’s leadership, 
                                                          
 405.  Baer, supra note 392, at 610. 
 406.  Patterns in Parallel Proceedings: SEC Actions, DOJ Tools, LAW360 (Jan. 17, 2012), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/298489/patterns-in-parallel-proceedings-sec-actions-doj-tools. 
 407.  I-4. 
 408.  See Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Announces Departure of Enforcement Director David 
Meister (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6735-13.  Mr. Meister’s 
successor, Aitan Goelman, is a former SDNY prosecutor with a similar resume.  See Press Re-
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the CFTC adopted similar reforms to those undertaken by the SEC.409  As a 
result, the agency secured a number of high-profile victories—including in 
cases arising from the Libor and Fx scandals as well as the collapse of MF 
Global—and rose in the esteem of criminal authorities.410  To some degree, 
however, the CFTC’s reform efforts were hampered by the fact that Mr. 
Meister’s arrival at the CFTC coincided with the Republican takeover of 
Congress.  This political shift left the agency with a budget that was inade-
quate in light of its increased responsibilities under the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010.411  According to a former CFTC regulator, these budget constraints 
left the CFTC unable to use the hiring strategies that the SEC’s Enforce-
ment Division used in 2009 to recruit experienced former prosecutors from 
the private sector.412  Although the CFTC was able to laterally recruit a 
small number of prosecutors from the DOJ, it ultimately could not build a 
degree of litigation expertise comparable to the SEC’s.413  This experience 
suggests that funding constraints will sometimes leave agencies unable to 
adjust their enforcement strategies in response to the costs of cooperating 
with prosecutors. 
B.  Subject Matter Expertise 
Civil enforcement agencies will inevitably invest in developing sub-
stantive expertise in the fields they are charged with regulating.  The SEC’s 
staff, for example, includes members with substantial private sector and ac-
ademic experience in accounting, asset management, trading, economics, 
and more.414  Parallel proceedings enable prosecutors’ offices to harness 
this expertise while investing their resources in litigation and investiga-
tion.415  An adequately resourced prosecutor’s office, however, can also in-
vest in developing the substantive expertise necessary to prosecute complex 
                                                          
lease, CFTC, Enforcement Director Aitan Goelman to leave CFTC (Jan. 19, 2017), 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7517-17. 
 409.  See Ben Protess, Financial Watchdog with Bite to Depart His Agency, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
30, 2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/30/c-f-t-c-s-enforcement-chief-to-depart/. 
 410.  See id. (quoting the head of the criminal division of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York as saying that Meister “built the C.F.T.C.’s strongest enforcement program 
in memory”).  One of my interviewees, a former federal prosecutor now in private practice, con-
firmed that “the CFTC is more aggressive than it used to be and appears to have borrowed the 
SEC’s enforcement model.”  I-6. 
 411.  See Corey Boles & Jamila Trindle, CFTC Budget Request Is Cut, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 
2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203503204577038653502512684. 
 412.  I-7. 
 413.  Id. 
 414.  See supra note 340 and accompanying text. 
 415.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
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regulatory cases without cooperating with civil regulators.416  If the costs of 
cooperating with a civil regulator become too high, a prosecutor’s office 
can make these investments and thus decrease its reliance on parallel en-
forcement. 
More interestingly, however, the make-or-buy decision can motivate a 
civil regulator to invest in building the substantive expertise of an outside 
prosecutor’s office.  No matter how much a regulator invests in its own en-
forcement expertise, it will still lack a number of tools available to prosecu-
tors.417  Therefore, when the transaction costs of working with a particular 
prosecutor become unacceptable, a civil regulator might wish to cooperate 
with another prosecutor’s office rather than pursuing its enforcement goals 
unilaterally.418  For complex cases, however, the civil enforcer will prefer to 
work with a prosecutor who has some degree of substantive knowledge of 
the relevant regulatory field.419  If only one prosecutor’s office possesses 
the requisite level of substantive expertise, then a civil regulator will find 
itself in a bilaterally dependent relationship that leaves it vulnerable to ex-
ploitation.420  Even if no such exploitation occurs, a civil regulator’s en-
forcement priorities will be constrained by the number of cases that the 
prosecutor is willing and able to take. 
One solution is to break a prosecutor’s monopoly by investing in the 
substantive expertise of rival prosecutors.  Although costly in the short 
term, these investments provide a regulatory agency with a greater number 
of competent prosecutors with whom to coordinate.  This, in turn, makes 
the agency less reliant on any single U.S. Attorney’s Office and thus less 
susceptible to capture. 
A civil regulator wishing to pursue this strategy has at least three op-
tions available.  First, it may establish formal training and technical assis-
tance programs to educate prosecutors about the relevant aspects of their 
regulatory field.  For example, the CFTC sometimes provides training to 
law enforcement groups “on conducting parallel criminal and civil prosecu-
tion of commodities market manipulation and fraud,” and has conducted 
cross-agency training with the DOJ to educate both prosecutors and regula-
tors of their powers under the Dodd-Frank Act.421 
                                                          
 416.  The SDNY’s U.S. Attorney’s Office, for example, has considerable substantive expertise 
with respect to financial and regulatory crimes.  See supra notes 255–259 and accompanying text.  
 417.  See White, supra note 1 (“Criminal investigations unquestionably bring great value—
search warrants, wiretaps, and undercover operations are not in the SEC’s toolbox.”). 
 418.  See supra Part III.B. 
 419.  See supra notes 246–259 and accompanying text. 
 420.  See supra notes 227–229 and accompanying text. 
 421.  CFTC, FY 2011 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 47, 
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/2011apr.pdf.  Similarly, the 
SEC indirectly benefits from the National Association of Securities Dealer’s Criminal Prosecution 
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Second, an agency can permit its staff to work as Special Assistant 
U.S. Attorneys.  This program is arguably a boon to the civil enforcement 
attorneys who are appointed to serve as Special AUSAs, as it increases their 
employment opportunities as white-collar defense attorneys upon leaving 
government service.  According to former regulators, however, the program 
is also an effective strategy for building the capacity of the prosecutors’ of-
fices that collaborate with civil enforcement agencies.422  Speaking in praise 
of this program, a former senior officer at the SEC explained that it provid-
ed the agency’s staff with experience trying criminal cases while building 
the capacity of U.S. Attorneys’ Offices that might otherwise lack the so-
phistication and resources to prosecute securities fraud cases.423 
Perhaps the most effective strategy for breaking a prosecutorial mo-
nopoly, however, is for an agency to refer challenging cases to other prose-
cutors’ offices and invest the resources necessary—including extensive la-
bor power—to ensure that those cases are successful.  The SEC’s 
Enforcement Division adopted this approach under Robert Khuzami’s lead-
ership, when the agency began to collaborate with a greater number of U.S. 
Attorney’s Offices.  As a former senior officer at the SEC explained, since 
2009 the SEC has made a conscious effort to build relationships with, and 
refer cases to, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices beyond the Southern District of New 
York.424  This effort, he explained, partially reflects a conscious decision to 
build the capacities of these offices.425  Corroborating this account, another 
former SEC attorney added that the Enforcement Division pursued this 
strategy in part because the involvement of more U.S. Attorneys’ Offices 
meant “more capacity” to pursue parallel proceedings.426 
                                                          
Assistance Group (“CPAG”), which provides technical assistance to prosecutors concerning the 
investigation and prosecution of securities fraud.  See Barry R. Goldsmith, NASD Executive Vice 
President, Testimony Before the Finance and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee of the Com-
merce Committee (Sept. 13, 2000), http://www.finra.org/newsroom/speeches/091300-testimony-
finance-and-hazardous-materials-subcommittee-commerce-committee. 
 422.  Cf. Zheng, supra note 338, at 1276–80 (surveying the empirical literature that supports a 
“human capital” theory of the revolving door, according to which prosecutors are incentivized to 
aggressively pursue cases in order to demonstrate expertise that is valuable in the private sector).  
 423.  I-2. 
 424.  I-9. 
 425.  Id. 
 426.  I-5.  There are, of course, limits to the strategy of investing in the expertise of other agen-
cies.  For example, in complex regulatory fields, the expertise of judges may be relevant to an 
agency’s enforcement outcomes.  More research would be required, however, to determine wheth-
er such expertise favors or disfavors the agency.  Cf. Stephen J. Choi et al., Do Institutions Mat-
ter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 
WASH. U. L. Q. 869, 900 (2005) (finding a correlation between lower PSLRA attorneys’ fees and 
cases brought in district courts with a large number of securities fraud suits including the SDNY); 
Mark A. Lemley et al., Does Familiarity Breed Contempt Among Judges Deciding Patent Cases?, 
66 STAN. L. REV. 1121, 1124 (2014) (finding that judicial experience with patent infringement 
cases correlates with less favorable outcomes for patentees); Paul Weitzel, The End of Sharehold-
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This aspect of parallel enforcement has significant implications for any 
serious thinking about how best to reform parallel proceedings.  It is tempt-
ing to observe an agency that has dramatically improved its enforcement 
outcomes (or that has become laudably sensitive to due process considera-
tions) and trace those improvements to its own policy decisions.  The make-
or-buy structure of parallel proceedings, however, suggests that one might 
have to look beyond the agency’s own decisions to examine those of their 
collaborators. 
V.  APPLICATION: THE FBI EMBED PROGRAMS 
This Article has demonstrated that prosecutors’ and regulators’ choices 
are inter-dependent and influenced by the transaction costs of cooperation.  
It has further shown that agencies will implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) 
pursue institutional reforms that are designed to reduce or eliminate the 
transaction costs of parallel enforcement.  One recent institutional design 
innovation—which scholars had previously overlooked—powerfully illus-
trates these claims. 
In recent years, the DOJ has coordinated with the CFTC and the SEC 
to embed FBI agents and analysts within those agencies.427  This Part will 
offer the first academic analysis of the FBI embed programs. In doing so, it 
will use the make-or-buy framework both to explain why the agencies 
chose to integrate their operations in ambitious and highly experimental 
ways, and to analyze the specific institutional design choices that the agen-
cies made to guard their respective enforcement prerogatives. 
                                                          
er Litigation? Allowing Shareholders to Customize Enforcement Through Arbitration Provisions 
in Charters and Bylaws, 2013 BYU L. REV. 65, 95 n.134 (2013) (noting that “[t]he Southern Dis-
trict of New York . . .  has several judges with expertise in securities regulation, which plantiffs’ 
counsel have the same motivation to avoid” that they do with respect to the Delaware Court of 
Chancery). 
 427.  James B. Comey, Director, FBI, Statement Before the House Appropriations Committee, 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies: FBI Budget Request for 
Fiscal Year 2015 (March 26, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/fbi-budget-request-for-
fiscal-year-2015 (“Currently, we have embedded agents and analysts at the Securities and Ex-
change Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which allows the FBI to 
work hand-in-hand with U.S. regulators to mitigate the corporate and securities fraud threat.  Fur-
thermore, these relationships enable the FBI to identify fraud trends more quickly and to work 
with our operational and intelligence counterparts in the field to begin criminal investigations 
when deemed appropriate.”); James B. Comey, Director, FBI, Remarks to New York City Bar 
Third Annual White-Collar Crime Institute: Confronting Corporate Crime (May 19, 2014), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/confronting-corporate-crime (“We have agents and analysts 
embedded with the SEC and the [CFTC].  Together, we can identify trends quickly and open 
criminal investigations when necessary.”). 
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Memoranda of understanding between the FBI and the relevant civil 
agencies govern the scope of each program.428  According to a former SEC 
officer, the purposes of the embedded agents and analysts are to (1) avoid 
redundancies with criminal investigations (which ensures that an SEC in-
vestigation does not compromise a criminal investigation), (2) generate 
criminal interest, and (3) engage in secondary review of TCRs to determine 
whether they are appropriate for criminal referral.429  With respect to the 
SEC program, the FBI agents and analysts are embedded within the civil 
agency’s OMI, which was created in 2010.430  The OMI, housed within the 
SEC’s Enforcement Division, receives TCRs from governmental entities, 
citizens, SROs (including the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority), the 
exchanges, and the National Futures Association.  The office also handles 
suspicious activity reports for SEC registrants.  The OMI evaluates this in-
formation and makes some threshold determinations such as whether it is 
actionable, lies within the SEC’s jurisdiction, and whether the statute of 
limitations bars enforcement.431  If a matter is substantial but not within the 
SEC’s jurisdiction, the OMI may refer the information to other authorities 
even if it does not go further within the SEC.432  It thus has a central role to 
play in generating parallel enforcement cases. 
The FBI embed programs increase the payoffs of parallel enforcement 
by circumventing the practical and doctrinal limits on how prosecutors and 
civil regulators share information.433  The SEC’s embed program—which is 
the only one for which the relevant information is publicly available—
provides the FBI with real-time information as it comes into the SEC.434  As 
                                                          
 428.  See INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS, CREDIBLE DETERRENCE IN THE ENFORCEMENT 
OF SECURITIES REGULATION 25 (June 2015), 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD490.pdf (“[T]he US CFTC has entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to second US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Spe-
cial Agents and Intelligence Analysts from the FBI’s Economic Crimes Unit into the US CFTC to 
facilitate cooperation and improve the process for referring information between the two agencies 
to combat securities fraud and market manipulation.  The US SEC also entered into an MoU with 
the FBI to embed FBI agents within the US SEC’s Office of Market Intelligence.”); see also Rob-
ert Khuzami, Testimony Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Testimony 
Concerning Investigating and Prosecuting Fraud after the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act 
(September 22, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2010/ts092210rk.htm. 
 429.  I-12. 
 430.  Protess & Ahmed, supra note 217. 
 431.  I-12. 
 432.  Id. 
 433.  The programs thus exemplify what Daphna Renan has identified as “pooling,” a process 
by which agencies cooperate to create “joint structures” that enhance each agency’s powers be-
yond what they would otherwise be.  See Renan, supra note 38, at 211. 
 434.  See Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI, Statement Before the House Judiciary Commit-
tee, Washington, D.C. (May 9, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/oversight-of-the-
federal-bureau-of-investigation-3 (“In 2010, the FBI began embedding special agents at the SEC, 
which allows us to see tips about securities fraud as they come into the SEC’s complaint center.”); 
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reported by a former senior officer at the SEC, the initial goal of that agen-
cy’s embed program was to bring FBI agents and analysts “over the wall” 
so that criminal authorities could make use of SEC information without 
having to go through the process of making formal access requests for spe-
cific files.435  Section 24 of the Exchange Act limits the SEC’s availability 
to share information with other authorities without a formal access re-
quest.436  Therefore, as explained by a former SEC officer, FBI agents and 
analysts are deemed to be SEC employees who are answerable to the Chief 
of the OMI and, by extension, the Enforcement Director.437  According to 
one journalistic account of the OMI, this structure permits the embedded 
FBI agents and analysts to access all SEC databases, providing the FBI with 
“a wealth of information about potential violators” of federal securities 
laws.438  Additionally, the SEC and FBI have disclosed that “[o]n occasion, 
embedded agents will use the SEC database for their own classified investi-
gations” without disclosing the identity of the person being examined to the 
Chief of the OMI.439 
The embed programs also give civil regulators access to FBI infor-
mation that they are formally unable to possess under rules governing sensi-
tive criminal evidence.  As a former senior officer at the SEC explained, 
one of the agency’s goals in designing the embedded agent program was to 
ensure that, in certain circumstances and through the FBI embeds, the SEC 
can access information from the FBI databases.440  This access appears to be 
circumscribed by “law enforcement protocols prohibiting prosecutors and 
the FBI from sharing investigative materials, such as wiretapped conversa-
tions, with securities regulators.”441  However, both the SEC and the CFTC 
enforcement staff appear to be able to review materials that remain under 
the formal custodial control of the FBI embedded agents. 
As an attorney knowledgeable about the CFTC’s practices explained, 
one of the ways in which the embedded agents coordinate information shar-
                                                          
see also Christopher L. Garcia & Boyd M. Johnson III, Defending Clients in Insider Trading In-
vestigations and Enforcement Actions, in DEFENDING CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS IN 
GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS § 14:18 (Daniel J. Fetterman & Mark P. Goodman eds., 2014). 
 435.  I-9. 
 436.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78x(c) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.24c-1(b) (2018). 
 437.  I-12. 
 438.  Protess & Ahmed, supra note 217. 
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ing is by acting as the repositories of information relevant to the CFTC to 
which the FBI has access.442  For example, agents from field offices can 
send “Section 302 reports”—notes of interviews with witnesses taken in the 
course of a criminal investigation—to the embedded agent.  CFTC attor-
neys can then review these reports while truthfully asserting that the docu-
ments have not left the custody of criminal investigators.443 
The embed programs not only amplify the benefits of parallel en-
forcement, but also minimize the costs.  By permitting FBI agents to access 
TCRs, the embed programs reduce the risk to prosecutors that a civil regu-
latory agency will inadvertently compromise a criminal investigation.  At 
the same time, the regulatory agencies benefit from the expertise that FBI 
agents possess regarding the range of criminal charges that specific infor-
mation might be able to support.444  By granting criminal investigators un-
fettered access to agency information, however, the agency risks losing con-
trol of its enforcement priorities.  Specifically, one might worry that the FBI 
agents would share the information with their favored prosecutors without 
regard for the civil agency’s distinct enforcement goals.445  The SEC’s em-
bed program is designed to eliminate this risk.  According to a former sen-
ior officer at the SEC, embedded agents are prohibited from reaching out 
directly to FBI field offices or U.S. Attorney’s Offices with information 
learned through OMI without the approval of the Chief of OMI or the Di-
rector of Enforcement.  This safeguard, explained the former senior officer, 
ensures that FBI agents do not jump the gun on potential SEC investiga-
tions.446 
By reducing the transaction costs of parallel enforcement, the FBI em-
bed programs have had a significant impact on how the financial regulatory 
                                                          
 442.  I-8. 
 443.  Id.  As this attorney explained, however, the CFTC must still make an access request to 
the prosecutors conducting an investigation in order to be granted access to criminal discovery.  
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 444.  I-9. 
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ever, the agent cannot make a referral on behalf of the agency; the Director of Enforcement holds 
the final authority over the referral decision.  Id. 
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agencies pursue parallel proceedings.  As reported by an attorney familiar 
with the CFTC’s enforcement practices, one of the goals of the FBI embed 
program was to ensure that criminal referrals were not “merely sent out into 
the abyss,” but were made in a way that would better ensure that criminal 
authorities would work the case.447  Consistent with this goal, the CFTC re-
ported that in Fiscal Year 2010 (prior to the embed program’s implementa-
tion) 25 cases were filed by outside criminal and civil law enforcement au-
thorities that included CFTC cooperation.448  And in Fiscal Year 2015, the 
agency “handled nearly 300 matters involving ‘joint cooperation with Fed-
eral and state criminal and civil authorities.”449 
In facilitating more efficient coordination between prosecutors and 
regulators, the FBI embed programs also raise concerns that bear further 
analysis.  For example, the embedded agent program may increase the in-
formation asymmetries between defendants and prosecutors, and thus tra-
duce the “civil discovery principle of equal knowledge.”450  Given the lim-
ited discovery available in criminal cases, the presence of embedded agents 
within a civil regulatory agency could enable civil regulators to review in-
formation that targets of a parallel proceeding may never see.  Consider, for 
example, a situation in which an embedded FBI agent has access to a Sec-
tion 302 report that has not been disclosed to the defendant.  It appears that 
a civil regulator could review that document, but subsequently claim during 
discovery that the document lies outside the agency’s custodial control.  
This risk may be more than simply hypothetical.  One defense attorney fa-
miliar with the embed program expressed frustration that, in one instance, 
the SEC claimed it did not have access to documents that in practice it was 
likely able to see.451  The likely reason for the denial, according to this de-
fense attorney, was that the documents in question were under the formal 
custodial control of an FBI agent down the hall from the SEC staff attor-
neys.452  As the white-collar bar becomes more aware of the embedded 
agent program, such complaints could make their way into litigation. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has provided an explanatory theory of the structures and 
incentives that shape parallel enforcement.  While this is fundamentally a 
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descriptive project, it is also a prolegomenon for further, normative work.  
The doctrine governing parallel proceedings facilitates modes of coordina-
tion that expand the government’s freedom to select the combination of civ-
il and criminal investigatory techniques that best accomplish their goals in a 
given case.  It also provides regulators with the flexibility to decide which 
remedies to pursue—civil, criminal, or both—and the ability to share the 
information relevant to making those enforcement decisions. 
The make-or-buy framework can be used to better clarify the threats 
that discretion might pose to defendants, and how best to address those 
threats.  One can apply the framework, for example, to identify the ways in 
which the promise of a criminal conviction might distort the goals of civil 
regulators.  The framework can also be used to diagnose information dis-
parities between defendants and regulators that parallel proceedings may 
exacerbate.  As this Article has shown, however, it is unlikely that doctrinal 
reforms to parallel proceedings are feasible or, for that matter, desirable.  
Hence, careful attention to the structure of parallel proceedings—the sort of 
attention this Article has provided—is a prerequisite for any serious consid-
eration of such normative questions. 
